Selected Issues in Sovereign Debt Litigation by Weisz, George et al.
ARTICLES
SELECTED ISSUES IN SOVEREIGN DEBT LITIGATION
GEORGE WEISZ*
NANCY E. SCHWARZKOPF**
MIMI PANITCH***
What happens when a sovereign debtor' fails to make principal or
interest payments due under a restructuring, rescheduling, new money
or other financing agreement, or declares a moratorium on repayment
of foreign debt, and one or more of its foreign creditors decides to pur-
sue its various legal remedies to compel repayment of that debt? In this
Article we discuss in what court such an action is likely to be litigated
and how such an action might differ from an action brought against a
private debtor. We also examine what body of law a court is likely to
apply and certain defenses that a sovereign debtor may have available
to such an action because of its sovereign status, that a private debtor
could not employ.2
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I A sovereign debtor is a state, or a political subdivision, agency or instrumentality
of a state, which has borrowed money pursuant to a loan or other financing agreement.
" Although not addressed here, it has been suggested that Article VIII, section
2(b) of the Bretton Woods Agreement, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 1411, T.I.A.S.
No. 1501, at 12, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, 66, 68, may, in proper circumstances, provide a de-
fense to an action brought in the United States against a sovereign debtor under a loan
agreement.
Article VIII, section 2(b) provides that "[e]xchange contracts which involve the
currency of any member and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of
that member maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unen-
forceable in the territories of any member." Id.
To date, United States courts have not enforced section 2(b) as a defense to an
action on a sovereign debt agreement. Instead, United States courts have narrowly con-
strued the term "exchange contract" to mean only those transactions which are "con-
tracts for the exchange of one currency against another or one means of payment
against another," explicitly excluding international loan agreements. Libra Bank Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION: NEW YORK COURT PROCEDURES
A sovereign debtor's substantive liability under its financing agree-
ments and the amenability of its assets to attachment, execution or set-
off could be decided in the context of judicial proceedings, which could
be commenced in any court where the sovereign debtor is subject to
jurisdiction.' Litigation resulting from a default under a financing
agreement is frequently brought in state and federal courts sitting in
New York, since most money center banks and their counsel are located
there and since financing agreements typically provide that New York
law governs the agreement and that the sovereign debtor submits to the
jurisdiction of state and federal courts in New York. Therefore, it is
useful to summarize the general course that such proceedings would
likely take in New York.
If an action is commenced in any United States court against a
borrower that is a "foreign state" (within the meaning of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ("FSIA")),4 either directly under
any financing agreement or to enforce a foreign judgment thereunder,
the defendant/sovereign debtor would have sixty days to file a respon-
sive pleading or motion.5 A plaintiff (particularly if it had already ob-
v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (quoting J.
Gold, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS: VOLUME II 425 (1982)). See also J.
Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd., 37 N.Y.2d 220, 333 N.E.2d 168,
371 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975); Banco do Brasil v. A.C.
Israel Commodity Co., 12 N.Y.2d 371, 239 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 906 (1964). By contrast, some European courts have construed the term "ex-
change contract" contained in section 2(b) broadly to include all contracts that "in any
way affect a country's exchange resources," thereby potentially including international
loan agreements in the definition of exchange contracts. Schwab, The Unenforceability
of International Contracts Violating Foreign Exchange Regulations: Article VIII, Sec-
tion 2(b) of the International Monetary Fund Agreement, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 967, 977
(1985) (citations omitted). See generally Nurick, The International Monetary Fund
Articles of Agreement, in JUDIcIAL ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DEBT OBLI-
GATIONS 107 (D. Sasson & D. Bradlow eds. 1987); Zamora, Recognition of Foreign
Exchange Controls in International Creditors' Rights Cases: The State of the Art, 21
INT'L LAW. 1055 (1987).
For a discussion of the doctrines of act of state and comity, which could in proper
circumstances provide a defense to liability of a sovereign debtor, see Buchheit, Act of
State and Comity: Recent Developments, in JuDCIAL ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL DEBT OBLIGATIONS 95 (D. Sasson & D. Bradlow eds. 1987).
" See infra notes 12-29 and accompanying text.
4 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988). Under the FSIA, a foreign state "includes a
political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state" which is at least majority-owned by a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1988).
1 28 U.S.C. § 1608(d) (1988). Such an action could be brought initially in either
state or federal court. However, if it were commenced in state court, the foreign sover-
eign defendant would in all probability want to remove the case to federal court, and
could do so automatically by filing a removal petition within thirty days of receiving the
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tained a foreign judgment) would probably make a motion for sum-
mary judgment shortly after initiating suit, alleging that no material
questions of fact exist and seeking a determination of liability based
solely upon the documentary record. The defendant would then have to
respond to this motion in ten days, but probably not earlier than the
sixtieth day after commencement of the action."
A motion for summary judgment would be submitted to the judge
for a decision on the merits.7 A court will ordinarily enforce a foreign
judgment previously rendered under an agreement, unless the defend-
ant could demonstrate that the foreign court lacked jurisdiction, the for-
eign court failed to afford it proper notice of the proceedings, or that
the judgment was fraudulently obtained, all of which are unlikely.8
If a court in the United States enters a final judgment adverse to a
sovereign defendant, the plaintiff cannot seek to execute on the judg-
ment until the court has "determined that a reasonable period of time
has elapsed following the entry of judgment. . . ."' The purpose of this
provision is to give a foreign state defendant an opportunity to avoid
the embarrassment of execution by voluntarily paying the judgment.
The defendant has thirty days to appeal from any judgment.
However, during the pendency of any appeal, once the "reasonable
time" for voluntary payment of the judgment has elapsed, unless a
court-ordered stay of judgment is obtained, assets of the defendant are
subject to execution.10 Typically, such a stay cannot be obtained with-
out posting a bond. It would be difficult, if not impossible, for a foreign
sovereign defendant which had defaulted under its financing agree-
ments to post an adequate bond, unless it were to provide cash in the
full amount of the judgment to the bonding company as collateral. This
course of action might be unwise, however, because it would make as-
initial service of process in the suit. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441(d), 1446(b) (1988). See infra
notes 54-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether this right of removal
can be waived by a foreign state. The balance of the discussion in this section assumes
that proceedings will be conducted in federal court, although the rules governing suit,
attachment, and execution under the FSIA apply to actions in both state and federal
courts.
I A plaintiff is entitled to move for summary judgment twenty days after com-
mencement of suit. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a). However, the time for a sovereign defendant
to respond to such a motion would probably be extended until the expiration of the
sixty day period for filing a responsive pleading or motion under the FSIA.
7 For a discussion of the law the court is likely to apply, see infra notes 107-36
and accompanying text.
' See N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. 5301-5309 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1989).
9 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c) (1988).
10 For a discussion of when assets of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
state are deemed to be attachable as assets of that foreign state, see infra notes 179-88
and accompanying text.
1991]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
sets available for execution in the event of an unsuccessful appeal.
Discovery of the defendant would probably be permitted to enable
the plaintiff to locate assets for execution in the United States and else-
where. The interest of the defendant in not disclosing this information
might lead to its refusal to comply with such discovery requests, which
would in turn be likely to lead to various court-imposed sanctions. The
efficacy of such sanctions would ultimately depend upon the presence of
property in the United States belonging to the defendant that is suscep-
tible to attachment or execution under the FSIA.
2. CHOICE OF FORUM AND GOVERNING LAW CLAusEs: Do THEY
WORK?
Parties to sovereign debt agreements have a particular interest in
the ability to select in advance both the law that governs the parties'
relationship and the forum or fora in which any disputes arising under
the agreement will be resolved. The desirability of making a binding
choice of governing law is dear: the meaning of even a seemingly un-
ambiguous agreement depends ultimately on the significance that the
governing law gives to the parties' words. Unless the parties can agree
on that law in advance of any dispute, the very meaning of the agree-
ment and the parties' rights and obligations thereunder will be
uncertain.
For similar reasons, it is to the parties' advantage to ensure that
one or more acceptable jurisdictions will be available to resolve any
claim arising under a sovereign debt agreement. Some potential fora
may be unfamiliar with the law the parties have chosen to govern the
transaction, making their interpretation and application of that law un-
predictable. Some courts may be required by their own law to decide
the case under a different law than that selected by the parties, and
thus may apply an unforeseen body of law to the dispute. Moreover,
advance selection of an exclusive forum for litigation reduces the risk
that, in the event of litigation, a party will be forced to litigate an ac-
tion in an inconvenient or unfair forum. As a result, it has become
routine practice for parties to insert choice of forum and governing law
clauses into sovereign debt agreements. Because New York has a well-
developed body of commercial law and its courts are considered both
impartial and experienced in resolving disputes arising from sophisti-
cated commercial transactions, and because many of the lenders to for-
eign sovereign debtors are based in New York, such clauses often spec-
ify that the agreement shall be governed by New York law, and that
any disputes arising thereunder shall be resolved in New York state or
federal courts.
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When a dispute arises under an agreement containing such
clauses, the court before which the action has been brought must first
determine the enforceability of the clauses under its own legal doctrine
of conflicts of law. Conflicts law is somewhat arcane at best, but in
most cases the doctrinal sound and fury signifies nothing: both New
York state and federal courts look with favor upon choice of forum and
governing law clauses, and generally will give effect to them. This sec-
tion provides an introduction to the treatment of such clauses in the
courts of New York, and highlights some areas of uncertainty in the
law.
2.1. Choice of Forum Clauses
It is not surprising that, despite the advantages inherent in making
a binding choice of forum in advance, once litigation is contemplated or
commenced a party will frequently seek to evade the contractually se-
lected forum in favor of one which may offer a more convenient loca-
tion or a more favorable court or body of law. Hence, the question of
the effect a contractual forum selection clause has may arise in an ac-
tion pending in the contractual forum if the plaintiff has brought the
action there and the defendant seeks to alter the forum. Another situa-
tion where the enforceability of this clause is at issue occurs when the
plaintiff has begun an action in violation of an exclusive forum selec-
tion clause and the defendant seeks its dismissal or transfer to the con-
tractual forum."' Moreover, even where neither party objects to the ju-
risdiction of the contractual forum, in some circumstances that forum
may be unable to entertain the action.
2.1.1. The First Hurdle: Does the Court Have Jurisdiction?
In order to entertain an action, a court must have jurisdiction over
the parties to the action (personal jurisdiction)," proper venue,13 and
" A forum selection clause may be either "exclusive" or "non-exclusive." An ex-
clusive forum selection clause stipulates an exclusive forum for all litigation arising
under an agreement. Under such a clause, the parties submit to the jurisdiction of the
agreed forum, and agree not to commence a legal action relating to the agreement else-
where. In contrast, pursuant to a non-exclusive forum selection clause, the parties sub-
mit to the jurisdiction of the contractual forum, but remain free to bring an action in
any other forum which has jurisdiction over the dispute. See Gruson, Controlling Site
of Litigation, in SOVERFIGN LENDING: MANAGIrG LEGAL RIsK 29-30 (M. Gruson &
R. Reisner eds. 1984) (hereinafter Gruson, Controlling Site of Litigation).
"' The FSIA, read alone, appears automatically to confer on federal courts per-
sonal jurisdiction over a "foreign state" defendant whenever subject matter jurisdiction
exists under 28 U.S.C. section 1330(a) and service of process has been properly made
under 28 U.S.C. section 1608. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) (1988). Under the statute, there-
fore, "subject matter jurisdiction plus service of process equals personal jurisdiction."
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Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 308 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). Under section 1330(a), subject matter
jurisdiction exists with respect to every action against a foreign state to which the for-
eign state is not entitled to immunity. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1982).
The power of Congress to grant personal jurisdiction is, however, subject to consti-
tutional due process limitations. "Accordingly, each finding of personal jurisdiction
under the FSIA requires, in addition, a due process scrutiny of the court's power to
exercise its authority over a particular defendant." Texas Trading & Milling Corp.,
647 F.2d at 308. A finding of personal jurisdiction is considered to comport with due
process where a defendant's contacts with the forum are sufficiently extensive that the
assertion of personal jurisdiction is consistent with "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). For purposes of the FSIA, a
defendant's contacts with the United States as a whole, and not with any particular
forum, are judged against the due process standard of the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution. L'Europeene de Banque v. La Republica de Venezuela, 700 F. Supp.
114, 123 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). But cf. Pioneer Properties, Inc. v. Martin, 557 F.
Supp. 1354, 1358-61 (D. Kan 1983), appeal dismissed, 776 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1985)
(in this federal question case, the court considered only contacts with the forum in its
due process analysis). Where a defendant has consented to personal jurisdiction, due
process concerns will not normally be implicated. However, where a defendant is found
not to have consented freely to personal jurisdiction, a court may find that it has no
personal jurisdiction over a defendant, even where the subject matter jurisdiction and
service of process standards of the FSIA are satisfied. For example, in L'Europeene de
Banque, the court held that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Venezuela because of
the insufficiency of Venezuela's contacts with the United States with respect to Vene-
zuela's assumption of management power over a failing financial institution. 700 F.
Supp. at 125. The suit was based in part upon agreements (executed by the financial
institution) that contained submissions to jurisdiction in New York. The court noted,
"[forum-selection clauses are favored when they are part of a 'freely negotiated private
international agreement, unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargain-
ing power.' Here, Venezuela did not engage in free negotiations with SFC's manage-
ment regarding what obligations it was assuming when it intervened SFC." Id. at 123
(citation omitted).
18 See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1988). This section provides for venue in federal court
actions generally. With respect to actions against foreign states it provides:
(f) A civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a)
of this title may be brought-
(1) in any judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substan-
tial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated;
(2) in any judicial district in which the vessel or cargo of a
foreign state is situated, if the claim is asserted under section
1605(b) of this title;
(3) in any judicial district in which the agency or instrumental-
ity is licensed to do business or is doing business, if the action is
brought against an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as
defined in section 1603(b) of this title; or
(4) in the United States District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia if the action is brought against a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof.
See also N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 503(a) (McKinney 1976) (providing for venue in
New York state courts "in the county in which one of the parties resided when it was
commenced; or, if none of the parties then resided in the state, in any county designated
by the plaintiff.").
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jurisdiction over the controversy itself (subject matter jurisdiction). 14
When an action is brought in the contractual forum, a well-drafted
forum selection clause operates as a submission to that forum's personal
jurisdiction,15 and as a consent to venue in the chosen forum.1 6 Such a
consent is valid in both New York state and federal courts. In both
court systems, it is well settled that parties may by agreement confer
ersonal jurisdiction and venue on the selected court,17 even though in
the absence of such an agreement one or both parties would not be
amenable to suit there.
The requirement that the court have subject matter jurisdiction
may, in some instances, prove more troublesome. The consent of the
parties cannot enlarge the subject matter jurisdiction of a court. Such
jurisdiction may only be conferred by the Constitution and the statutes
promulgated thereunder."' Although the United States federal district
14 Under the FSIA, subject matter jurisdiction exists with respect to every action
against a foreign state to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity. 28 U.S.c.
§ 1330(a) (1988).
'" See Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., 883 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1989).
For example, such a clause might provide:
The borrower irrevocably consents that any legal action or proceeding
against it or any of its property arising under or relating to this agreement
may be brought in any court of the State of New York or any federal
court of the United States of America located in the State of New York,
and hereby submits to and accepts with regard to any such action or pro-
ceeding, for itself and in respect of its property generally and uncondition-
ally the jurisdiction of the aforesaid courts. The Borrower irrevocably
waives (i) any objection which it may now or hereafter have to the laying
of the venue of any suit, action, or proceeding arising out of or relating to
this agreement in the State of New York, and (ii) any claim that the State
of New York is not a convenient forum for any such suit, action, or
proceeding.
The clause at issue in Credit Francais Int'l, S.A. v. Sociedad Finandera de Co-
mercio, C.A., 128 Misc. 2d 564, 490 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. 1985), contained essen-
tially this language.
16 Courts will construe a consent to personal jurisdiction in a forum as a consent
to venue in that forum. See Coface v. Optique du Monde, Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 500, 506
(S.D.N.Y. 1980). By the same reasoning, a consent to venue will sometimes be con-
strued as a consent to personal jurisdiction in the forum. See Richardson Greenshields
Sec., Inc. v. Metz, 566 F. Supp. 131, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
17 National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964);
Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-68 (1939); Sherman v.
Moore, 86 F.R.D. 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Fidan v. Austral Am. Trading Corp., 8
Misc. 2d 598, 600, 168 N.Y.S.2d 27, 30 (Sup. Ct. 1957). See also Frontier Excavating,
Inc. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 50 Misc. 2d 232, 233, 269 N.Y.S.2d 782,
783 (Sup. Ct. 1966); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 501 (McKinney 1976) (providing that
"[slubject to the provisions of subdivision two of section 510, written agreement fixing
place of trial, made before an action is commenced, shall be enforced upon a motion for
change of place of trial.").
.s See Neirbo, 308 U.S. at 167; Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. 308, 316 (1870)
("By jurisdiction over the subject-matter is meant the nature of the cause of action and
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courts are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction, they are given a
specific statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction over civil actions
against foreign states as to which foreign states do not have a defense of
sovereign immunity. " Because sovereign immunity does not bar juris-
diction if the sovereign entity has waived its immunity,20 and sovereign
debt agreements invariably provide for waivers of immunity as to any
actions arising thereunder, district courts will have the power to hear
almost any action under a debt agreement against a foreign sovereign
debtor.21
In contrast, although the courts of New York State have general
subject matter jurisdiction, lack of subject matter jurisdiction provides
at least a theoretical bar to the adjudication in New York state courts of
certain disputes arising pursuant to sovereign debt agreements. The
New York Business Corporation Law ("B.C.L.")22 denies New York
of the relief sought; and this is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the
court, and is to be sought for in the general nature of its powers, or in authority spe-
dally conferred."); Reale Int'l, Inc. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 330, 331-
32 (2d Cir. 1981); Benson v. Eastern Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 174 N.Y. 83, 86, 66 N.E.
627, 628 (1903); Fidan, 8 Misc. 2d at 599, 168 N.Y.S.2d at 30.
x, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1988).
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1988).
21 For a more complete discussion of sovereign immunity to jurisdiction, see infra
notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
2 Section 1314(b) provides:
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this article, an action or special pro-
ceeding against a foreign corporation may be maintained by another for-
eign corporation of any type or kind or by a non-resident in the following
cases only:
(1) Where it is brought to recover damages for the breach of a con-
tract made or to be performed within this state, or relating to property
situated within this state at the time of the making of the contract.
(2) Where the subject matter of the litigation is situated within this
state.
(3) Where the cause of action arose within this state ....
(4) Where, in any case not included in the preceding subparagraphs,
a non-domiciliary would be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the
courts of this state under section 302 of the civil practice law and rules.
(5) Where the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business or
authorized to do business in this state.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1314(b) (McKinney 1986).
Although section 1314 does not expressly limit New York state court subject mat-
ter jurisdiction in actions against foreign states themselves, it does limit jurisdiction over
suits against foreign governmental corporations. These corporations would likely in-
clude the central bank of a foreign state (which is likely to be a borrower under, or
guarantor of obligations incurred in, sovereign debt agreements). See Gruson, Contrac-
tual Choice of Law and Choice of Forum: Unresolved Issues, in JuDIcIAL ENFORCE-
MENT OF INTERNATIONAL DEBT OBLIGATIONS 1, 39 (D. Sasson & D. Bradlow eds.
1987) (hereinafter Gruson, Contractual Choice of Law and Choice of Forum). See also
N.Y. BAN KIG LAW § 200-b(2) (McKinney 1990) (containing provisions parallel to
section 1314 with respect to actions by nonresidents against foreign banks).
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state courts subject matter jurisdiction over actions by nonresidents"3 of
New York State against foreign corporations, including foreign govern-
mental corporations, unless the foreign corporation or the action itself
bears some reasonable relationship to the state.2 4 Thus, in some cir-
cumstances, parties to a contract might provide that New York law
governs the agreement, and that any disputes arising under it are to be
resolved by New York state courts, only to find that, pursuant to sec-
tion 1314 of the B.C.L., such an action, to the extent it is against a
foreign corporation, cannot be brought in those courts.
In 1984, the New York State legislature responded to concerns
that existing New York law did not provide sufficient certainty for par-
ties wishing to apply New York law to their agreements or to submit to
the jurisdiction of New York courts by enacting new provisions which
expanded the subject matter jurisdiction of New York courts to include
certain previously barred actions. Newly enacted section 5-1401 of the
New York General Obligations Law ("G.O.L.")"5 permits parties to
make a binding decision that New York law will govern the agreement,
as long as it relates to a transaction covering not less than two hundred
fifty thousand dollars in the aggregate, even if the agreement bears no
13 A resident is deemed to include a domestic corporation or a foreign corporation
authorized to transact business in the state. Cf N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. 503(c) (Mc-
Kinney 1976).
"' Courts construing section 1314 have held it to be a restriction on subject matter
jurisdiction. See Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812, 815 n.4 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840 (1969); Fidan v. Austral Am. Trading Corp., 8
Misc. 2d 598, 600, 168 N.Y.S.2d 27, 30-31 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (discussing section 225 of
New York General Corporation Law, the predecessor of section 1314). This restriction
reflects the New York policy against utilizing its courts for the resolution of disputes by
nonresidents. See id. Thus, its limitations are mandatory upon the courts and cannot be
waived by the parties. Id. ("It is jurisdictional and may be raised by a party affirma-
tively or by the court on its own motion at any time before judgment. If the action does
not fall within the subdivisions of this section, the court must dismiss it.").
Section 5-1401 provides:
1. The parties to any contract, agreement or undertaking, contingent or
otherwise, in consideration of, or relating to any obligation arising out of a
transaction covering in the aggregate not less than two hundred fifty thou-
sand dollars, including a transaction otherwise covered by subsection one
of section 1-105 of the uniform commercial code, may agree that the law
of this state shall govern their rights and duties in whole or in part,
whether or not such contract, agreement or undertaking bears a reasonable
relation to this state. This section shall not apply to any contract, agree-
ment or undertaking (a) for labor or personal services, (b) relating to any
transaction for personal, family or household services, or (c) to the extent
provided to the contrary in subsection two of section 1-105 of the uniform
commercial code.
2. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to limit or deny the
enforcement of any provision respecting choice of law in any other con-
tract, agreement or undertaking.
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (McKinney 1989).
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relationship to the state. Similarly, newly enacted G.O.L. section 5-
140228 provides that an action under an agreement can be maintained
in a New York state court where the parties to an agreement have
stipulated, in accordance with section 5-1401, that New York law gov-
erns their agreement, and the agreement relates to a transaction cover-
ing not less than one million dollars in the aggregate and contains a
submission of the parties to New York state court jurisdiction. Thus,
where the jurisdictional amount, consent, and choice of law require-
ments of section 5-1402 are satisfied, a court no longer needs to deter-
mine whether one or more of the B.C.L. section 1314 bases of jurisdic-
tion is present in order to establish subject matter jurisdiction over an
action between a non-New York resident and a foreign corporation.
2 7
t Section 5-1402 provides:
1. Notwithstanding any act which limits or affects the right of a person to
maintain an action or proceeding, including, but not limited to, paragraph
(b) of section thirteen hundred fourteen of the business corporation law
and subdivision two of section two hundred-b of the banking law, any
person may maintain an action or proceeding against a foreign corpora-
tion, non-resident, or foreign state where the action or proceeding arises
out of or relates to any contract, agreement or undertaking for which a
choice of New York law has been made in whole or in part pursuant to
section 5-1401 and which (a) is a contract, agreement or undertaking, con-
tingent or otherwise, in consideration of, or relating to any obligation aris-
ing out of a transaction covering in the aggregate, not less than one million
dollars, and (b) which contains a provision or provisions whereby such
foreign corporation or non-resident agrees to submit to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this state.
2. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to affect the en-
forcement of any provision respecting choice of forum in any other con-
tract, agreement or undertaking.
N.Y. GEN. OnuG. LAw § 5-1402 (McKinney 1989).
This language contains a puzzling inconsistency. The first part of section 5-
1402(1) allows any person to maintain an action against "a foreign corporation, non-
resident, or foreign state" where the statutory conditions are met. N.Y. GEN. OBMG.
LAW § 5-1402(1) (McKinney 1989) (emphasis added). However, the latter part of
section 5-1402(1), referring to the requirement of a contractual submission to New
York's jurisdiction, states "and (b) which contains a provision or provisions whereby
such foreign corporation or non-resident agrees to submit to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state." Id.
This inconsistency appears to have been mere oversight on the part of the statute's
drafters. The legislative memorandum accompanying the bill notes that "it is assumed
that, the New York Courts will interpret the word 'non-resident' in Section 5-1402
liberally for purposes of Rule 327 to include foreign sovereigns and instrumentalities as
well as foreign partnerships." Memorandum of Assemblyman Mark Alan Siegal, 1984
NEw YoRK STATE LEGis. ANN. 156, 157. In light of this language, it seems probable
that the inclusion of the words "or foreign state" in the first part of section 5-1402 is a
redundancy.
2' In contrast, New York state courts will always have subject matter jurisdiction
over an action by a New York resident against a foreign corporation, whether or not
the action or the foreign corporation bears some reasonable relationship to the state. See
Jacobsen v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 128 Misc. 138, 140,
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Even without the benefit of section 5-1402, however, a New York
court will likely have subject matter jurisdiction over an action by a
nonresident plaintiff seeking repayment of a debt by a foreign govern-
mental corporation. In most sovereign debt agreements, at least one of
the section 1314 bases for subject matter jurisdiction will probably be
present, as the majority of such agreements are either "made" in New
York or are to be performed in New York.28 If, however, none of the
section 1314 jurisdictional bases is present and the requirements of sec-
tion 5-1402 are not satisfied, a contractual choice of a New York State
court forum cannot be honored because the chosen court will lack sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. For example, where an agreement that relates
to a transaction worth more than one million dollars bears no relation-
ship to New York State (because it was negotiated outside New York
by nonresidents and is not to be performed in the state) and specifies a
New York State forum, but chooses another law to govern the transac-
tion, New York State courts will lack the necessary statutory authoriza-
tion to hear an action under the agreement.2"
2.1.2. Enforcement of Choice of Forum Clauses
Even where a court has both personal and subject matter jurisdic-
tion, and venue is proper, under some circumstances a court will refuse
to hear an action. This situation is particularly likely when the agree-
ment at issue contains a forum selection clause that provides for an
exclusive choice of a different forum. The "enforceability" of a forum
selection clause typically arises in one of several contexts. First, if an
action is commenced in an excluded forum (i.e., a forum other than the
217 N.Y.S. 856, 858 (Sup. Ct. 1926) (construing an earlier version of section 1314, the
court noted that:
While ... discretion exists [whether to hear]. . . actions by non-residents
or foreign corporations against foreign corporations [where such suits were
authorized by the statute], it does not exist in actions brought by residents
or domestic corporations against foreign corporations. In the latter case the
right of action is positive, and jurisdiction is compulsory, if properly ob-
tained by the service of process.
(citations omitted)).
23 N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 1314(b)(1) (McKinney 1986). See J. Zeevi & Sons,
Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd., 37 N.Y.2d 220, 226-27, 333 N.E.2d 168, 172,
371 N.Y.S.2d 892, 897-98, (1975) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975) (where New York
was to be the place of payment of a letter of credit, and repudiation rather than pay-
ment was made in New York, the cause of action arose in New York for purposes of
the jurisdictional statutes).
'9 See Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Envases Venzolanos, S.A., 740 F.
Supp. 260, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). In contrast, if the parties to such a transaction have
chosen New York State law to govern, the forum selection clause will be enforceable by
virtue of the section 5-1402 override of the jurisdictional restrictions of section 1314.
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one designated as the exclusive forum in which litigation will be con-
ducted), the issue of the enforceability of a forum selection clause will
arise if the defendant moves to dismiss the action on the ground that the
court should, as a matter of contract law, enforce the parties' selection
of an exclusive forum for litigation. Second, a defendant in this situa-
tion may, additionally or alternatively, move to dismiss or stay the ac-
tion in favor of the contractual forum under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.30 Moreover, if the excluded forum is a federal court, the
defendant may seek to transfer the action under 28 U.S.C. section
1404(a) 1 to a federal court authorized to hear the action pursuant to
the forum selection clause. Third, even if the action is commenced in a
forum permitted by the forum selection clause, a defendant may none-
theless move to stay or dismiss the action in favor of a more convenient
forum in either a state or federal court under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens or, if in a federal court, to transfer the action under 28
U.S.C. Section 1404(a). Although the issue of the enforceability of fo-
rum selection clauses typically arises in one of these three procedural
postures, federal courts do not make precise analytical distinctions
among them. As a result, it is impossible to derive any simple and reli-
able rules for the enforceability of such clauses that will be valid in all
three settings.
(a) Specific Enforcement of Forum Selection Clauses
(i) The Federal Rule
When an action is commenced outside an exclusive forum, the first
question before the court is whether the court will specifically enforce
the forum selection clause and dismiss the action. The Supreme Court
confronted precisely this issue in the seminal case of Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co.,2 where the defendant made a motion to dismiss a fed-
eral admiralty action brought in violation of an exclusive forum selec-
tion clause. The Court phrased the issue as "whether [the district court]
should have exercised its jurisdiction to do more than give effect to the
legitimate expectations of the parties, manifested in their freely negoti-
ated agreement, by specifically enforcing the forum clause.""3 The
30 For a discussion of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, see infra notes 73-
106 and accompanying text.
32 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988). Section 1404(a) provides: "For the convenience of
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." Id.
407 U.S. 1 (1972).
3 Id. at 12.
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Court held that under federal law, forum selection clauses "are prima
facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the
resisting party to be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances."'"
Following Bremen, courts have declined to enforce forum selection
clauses as unreasonable in essentially six situations: (1) where the
clause was procured through fraud; (2) where the clause was procured
through an abuse of bargaining power; (3) where the contractual forum
was not impartial; (4) where a strong public policy of the forum would
be violated by the law which would be applied in the contractual fo-
rum; (5) where a statute restricts the enforceability of the clause; and
(6) where the contractual forum is "seriously inconvenient" for the trial
of the action.
3 5
The fraud and overreaching defenses to enforcement of a forum
selection clause would generally not be available in actions between so-
phisticated parties to complex agreements. But even sovereign lending
agreements are not always negotiated by parties of equal commercial
experience and sophistication. Hence, it is possible that, in certain situ-
Id. at 10. Any discussion of the "enforcement" of forum selection clauses
presents certain analytic difficulties. Courts often speak in terms of "enforcing" or
"specifically enforcing" such a clause, which implies that the effect of the forum clause
is a matter of substantive contract law. This same language is also used, however, in
the course of a court's disposition of a motion to dismiss a case for forum non con-
veniens, or to transfer a case pursuant to section 1404(a), which most likely involves
issues of procedural law. See infra notes 73-106 and accompanying text. Thus, it is
often not clear whether a court enforces a forum selection clause as a matter of substan-
tive or procedural law.
In fact, in Bremen, the Court speaks of specific enforcement. 407 U.S. at 12, 15.
Yet the case arose on the defendant's forum non conveniens motion to dismiss the case
in favor of the contractual forum. Because Bremen was an admiralty case, this proce-
dure/substance distinction was of little importance. Federal courts having admiralty
jurisdiction apply federal law to questions of both substance and procedure. However,
the distinction can be critical. In some circumstances, federal courts apply federal law
to procedural questions, but are bound to apply the substantive law of the state in
which they sit. See infra notes 73-106 and accompanying text.
The confusion is well illustrated by Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucd Am., Inc., 858
F.2d 509, 512-13 (9th Cir. 1988), where the court granted a motion to dismiss the case
on the basis of a forum selection clause which designated an alternate exclusive forum.
Although the court spoke of specific enforcement of that clause, it granted the dismissal
as a matter of federal procedural law. Indeed, since Manetti-Farrow was a diversity
action, the court only could have applied federal law to the question by first finding
that it was an issue of procedure. See infra notes 73-106 and accompanying text.
"' Gruson, Controlling Site of Litigation, supra note 11, at 33. The Bremen rule
has provided the standard both for motions to specifically enforce a forum selection
cause and for motions to dismiss a case involving a forum selection clause for forum
non conveniens. Thus, these factors will be relevant in both contexts. See infra notes
73-106 and accompanying text. See Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377 (9th
Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 39 (1990) (under Bremen, the court refused to
enforce the forum selection clause on two independent grounds: disparity in bargaining
power and grave inconvenience).
1991]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
ations, a sovereign borrower might plausibly claim that its agreement to
an unfavorable forum selection clause was induced by fraud or over-
whelmingly unequal bargaining power."8
In some instances, statutory restrictions on the freedom of parties
to choose a forum may prevent courts from enforcing a forum selection
clause. Although New York places few restraints on the parties' right
to select a New York forum 37 B.C.L. section 1314 may deprive New
York courts of subject matter jurisdiction over certain actions, thereby
precluding enforcement of a forum selection clause. 8
"Serious inconvenience," as used by the Bremen Court,3 9 is a term
of art: to abrogate a forum selection clause on the basis of inconve-
nience to the parties, litigation in the contractual forum must be so
gravely inconvenient to the resisting party that it will be essentially
deprived of a meaningful day in court.40 This is a much higher level of
inconvenience than would be necessary to justify a transfer under the
traditional forum non conveniens doctrine.41 In the absence of a forum
selection clause, the Supreme Court has held that dismissal on the
ground of forum non conveniens would be appropriate where another
forum would have jurisdiction to hear the case, and where the inconve-
nience of the chosen forum to the defendant substantially outweighs the
convenience to the plaintiff.42 But where an agreement contains a fo-
rum selection clause, any inconvenience to the parties should be foresee-
able, and, indeed, bargained over at the time of contracting. Under
these circumstances, the inconvenience must surpass what the parties
38 In at least one case, a federal court has held that where a sovereign defendant
had no meaningful opportunity to negotiate a consent-to-jurisdiction clause, it could not
be bound by that clause. See L'Europeene de Banque v. La Republica de Venezuela,
700 F. Supp. 114, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
37 See Gruson, Controlling Site of Litigation, supra note 11, at 35.
s See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. See also L'Europeenne de Ban-
que, 700 F. Supp. at 123 (court noted that it would have lacked subject matter jurisdic-
tion in an action between the original parties to an international lending agreement,
and therefore the forum selection clause designating that court as the forum for litiga-
tion would have been unenforceable in such an action).
Even law which is not jurisdictional in nature may occasionally have a similar
effect. E.g., Behring Int'l Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 699 F.2d 657, 662-63 (3d
Cir. 1983), reh'g denied, 712 F.2d 45 (3d Cir. 1983)(the court held that Executive
Order No. 12294, which provided a mechanism for resolution of all disputes between
American citizens and the new Iranian government as part of the settlement of the Iran
hostage crisis, rendered unenforceable a choice of forum clause in an agreement be-
tween a U.S. company and an Iranian agency).
39 407 U.S. 1 at 17.
40 Id. at 18-19. See Shute, 897 F.2d at 389.
41 For a discussion of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, see infra notes 73-106
and accompanying text.
42 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981), reh'g denied, 455
U.S. 928 (1982); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).
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could reasonably have foreseen to justify a refusal to enforce the parties'
bargain.4
Finally, in determining the enforceability of a forum selection
clause, the neutrality of the contractual forum and any important pub-
lic policy of the forum where the action is pending that would be vio-
lated by the law to be applied in the contractual forum will be relevant.
The neutrality of a selected forum has, however, rarely been questioned
by New York courts in the years since it was first raised as a factor in
Bremen."'
Although the Bremen court implied that absence of neutrality
could be a basis for a court's refusal to enforce a forum selection clause,
it cautioned courts against taking "a provincial attitude regarding the
fairness of other tribunals." 45 Nonetheless, in sovereign lending agree-
ments, this neutrality factor may, in rare instances, assume some im-
portance. In the unlikely event that lenders have agreed to the sovereign
borrower's courts as the exclusive forum, it is possible that United
States courts might refuse to enforce the parties' choice on the ground
that the chosen forum lacks neutrality.
The Supreme Court noted in Bremen that "[a] contractual choice-
of-forum clause should be held unenforceable if enforcement would
contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought.
.. . Such public policy concerns normally arise in connection with
differences in the substantive law that would be applied in the compet-
ing fora.'7 One potential situation exists, however, in which the
Bremen rule might have a different application in FSIA cases than in
other cases. Although a forum's public policy would not normally pre-
vent a court from accepting a case and applying that forum's law, such
public policy concerns may be implicated when a non-United States
citizen brings suit against a foreign sovereign in a United States court."8
Therefore, it is possible that in a loan transaction that does not involve
American parties and that is not related to the United States, a motion
to dismiss for forum non conveniens may be granted, despite a contrac-
tual selection of a New York court.49
'13 Bremen, 407 U.S. at 16-18.
44 Id. at 12. See Gruson, Controlling Site of Litigation, supra note 11, at 44-45.
4' Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12.
46 Id. at 15.
47 See, e.g., Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 1967) (the
court invalidated the forum selection clause because United States law would have in-
validated a certain contract clause and the law that would have been applied in the
contractual forum would have upheld that clause).
48 See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
4, See id.
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(ii) The New York Rule
In connection with the enactment of G.O.L. sections 5-1401 and
5-1402,5o the New York State legislature enacted New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules ("C.P.L.R.") 327(b),5" which limits a New
York state court's discretion to dismiss or stay an action brought under
an agreement containing a New York forum selection clause. Under
this provision, a New York state court is prohibited from staying or
dismissing an action on the ground of forum non conveniens "where the
action arises out of or related to a contract, agreement or undertaking"
which conforms to the requirements of Section 5-1402.52 These re-
quirements are satisfied by any agreement which stipulates that New
York law will govern the agreement, designates New York state courts
as a forum, and relates to a transaction covering not less than one mil-
lion dollars in the aggregate.
Thus, where an agreement relating to a transaction covering not
less than one million dollars calls for application of New York law in a
New York forum, a New York state court, in theory, may no longer
dismiss the action, even in extreme circumstances.5" In contrast, in the
rare case where an agreement specifies a New York state court as a
forum but designates another governing law, a defendant faced with an
action in New York state courts may be able to persuade the court to
dismiss or stay the action.
This strict enforcement of forum selection clauses in the New York
state court system may, however, be of limited importance to foreign
sovereign defendants. Even if a sovereign debt agreement specifies the
5 N.Y. GEN. OBIG. LAW § 5-1402 (McKinney 1989).
5 New York C.P.L.R. 327(b) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a) of this rule, the
court shall not stay or dismiss any action on the ground of inconvenient
forum, where the action arises out of or relates to a contract, agreement or
undertaking to which section 5-1402 of the general obligations law ap-
plies, and the parties to the contract have agreed that the law of this state
shall govern their rights or duties in whole or in part.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 327(b) (McKinney 1990).
' Id. New York C.P.L.R. 327(a) codifies the New York doctrine of forum non
conveniens as follows:
When the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the
action should be heard in another forum, the court, on the motion of any
party, may stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions
that may be just. The domicile or residence in this state of any party to the
action shall not preclude the court from staying or dismissing the action.
N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. 327(a) (McKinney 1990).
53 See infra note 117 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether public
policy concerns may override New York G.O.L. section 5-1402 and New York
C.P.L.R. 327(b).
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courts of New York State as the exclusive forum for the resolution of
disputes, and that choice of forum is enforceable under New York law,
a sovereign defendant may be able to remove the action to the appropri-
ate federal district court. The FSIA "guarantees foreign states the right
to remove any civil action from a state court to a federal court."" Al-
though the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that a for-
eign state can waive its right of removal if it does so in "clear and
unequivocal [terms]," 5 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
not addressed this question. 6 In view of the FSIA's preference for the
adjudication of actions against foreign sovereigns in federal court,5" 7 and
of the FSIA's structure (which makes explicit provision for waivers of
sovereign immunity and for agreements as to effective methods of ser-
vice, but which makes no comparable provision for waiver of the right
of removal), there is reason to believe that a sovereign defendant should
not be able to waive the right to remove an action from state to federal
court.5 8
(iii) The Law Applicable to FSIA Cases
Where a federal court has jurisdiction under the FSIA by virtue of
a defendant's status as a foreign state, it is not settled whether a court
will apply federal law or the law of the forum in which it sits (e.g.,
New York) when ruling upon the enforceability of forum selection
clauses. In cases where the jurisdiction of a federal court is founded
solely on diversity of citizenship of the parties,59 a federal court must
" Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 489 (1983). See 28
U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1988).
55 In re Delta Am. Re Ins. Co., 900 F.2d 890, 892 (6th Cir. 1990).
"Refco, Inc. v. Abdul Wahab Bin Ebrahim Gaadari & A.W. Galadari Com-
modities, No. 90 Civ. 1240 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist.
file). Though no forum selection clause was at issue, the court noted with approval
authorities that suggested that a foreign state could not waive its right of removal under
the FSIA.
'7 H.R. RExP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 32, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmiN. NEWS 6604, 6631.
" 14A C. WRIGHT, A. MI ER& E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCE-
DURE § 3729, (Supp. 1985). See also Proyecfin de Venezuela, S.A. v. Banco Industrial
de Venezuela, S.A., 760 F.2d 390, 396-97 (2d Cir. 1985) (While reserving the question
of whether a sovereign defendant could waive the right of removal, the court empha-
sized that the strong federal policy of channeling litigation against sovereign defendants
away from the state courts and into the federal courts supported a broad reading of the
right to remove. The court refused to find an express or implied waiver of that right
through contractual consent to jurisdiction.). But see Karl Koch Erecting Co. v. New
York Convention Center Dev. Corp., 838 F.2d 656, 659 (2d Cir. 1988) (exclusive state
forum selection clause in non-FSIA case constitutes waiver of right of removal).
59 Diversity of citizenship provides a basis for federal jurisdiction where certain
statutory requirements are met. The diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. section 1332, states:
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follow the substantive law of the state in which it sits, but will decide
questions of procedure according to federal law.6" In suits against a
foreign sovereign, however, the FSIA provides the sole basis for juris-
diction.6' Therefore, all such actions are federal question cases in which
the courts are not constitutionally bound to apply the substantive law of
the state in which they sit.62 Nevertheless, while the Constitution does
not require the application of state law in federal question cases, some
statutory grants of federal question jurisdiction have been held to re-
quire the federal courts to look to state substantive law for their rules of
decision.
63
Consequently, the question of whether federal courts will deter-
mine the enforceability of a forum selection clause under state or fed-
eral law depends upon two separate determinations. If the enforceabil-
ity of the clause is determined to be a question of procedure, the court
will apply federal law. If enforceability is considered a question of sub-
stance, however, the court must then determine whether Congress in-
tended the courts to apply state substantive law in FSIA cases, and will
apply state or federal law based on its understanding of Congress'
intent.6
The federal courts of appeals have split on whether the enforce-
ability of a forum selection clause 5 is a matter of substance, possibly
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil ac-
tions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between -
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects
of a foreign state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as
plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
60 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
61 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989);
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 489 (1983); Ruggiero v.
Compania Peruana de Vapores "Inca Capac Yupanqui", 639 F.2d 872, 875 (2d Cir.
1981).
11 See Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp., 629 F.2d 786
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981) (federal question jurisdiction arising
under the Edge Act).
6s See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462
U.S. 611, 622 n.11 (1983) (dictum comparing FSIA and Federal Tort Claims Act).
If the court applies state law, it must then determine whether to apply that
state's "whole" law, or merely its substantive law.
65 This issue arises again in a slightly different form when a party tests the en-
forceability of a forum selection clause by a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens
in federal court. In analyzing whether such a motion is to be decided as a matter of
procedural or of substantive law, some courts, such as Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci
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governed by state law,68 or procedure, governed by federal law.6" The
Supreme Court has not yet decided the issue.
(b) Transfers of Federal Court Actions Pursuant to Section 1404
Under 28 U.S.C. section 1404(a), a party can seek to transfer a
case from one federal court to another "[f]or the convenience of the
parties and witnesses [and] in the interest of justice."6 In Stewart Or-
ganization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,69 the Supreme Court held that a mo-
America, Inc., 858 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1988), speak of whether the enforceability of a
forum selection clase is a matter of substantive or procedural law. Other courts speak
of whether the particular testing mechanism, such as 28 U.S.C. section 1404(a) or
forum non conveniens, is substantive or procedural. Therefore, it is not certain whether
a court's holding that the enforceability of a forum selection clause is a matter of proce-
dural law, should be interpreted to mean that all the devices by which that enforceabil-
ity may be tested raise questions of procedure, or whether the court is referring only to
the device at issue in the case. See, e.g., Alexander Proudfoot Co. v. Thayer, 877 F.2d
912, 918-19 (11th Cir. 1989) (where the court held that a motion to dismiss on grounds
of a forum selection clause is substantive and must be decided under state law, even
though, after Ricoh, a motion to transfer the case under 28 U.S.C. section 1404(a)
grounded upon a forum clause would clearly be a procedural issue governed by federal
law). See In re Ricoh Corp., 870 F.2d 570 (11th Cir. 1989), on reh'g, Stewart Organi-
zation, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
" The Third Circuit has held that the enforceability of a forum selection clause is
a question of substantive law that must, in a diversity action, be determined under state
law. General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783 F.2d 352, 356-57 (3d
Cir. 1986). The Eleventh Circuit's position is somewhat unclear. In In re Ricoh Corp.,
the court on remand analyzed the petitioner's motion to transfer venue to the selected
forum under 28 U.S.C. section 1404(a), and concluded that federal law required that
the forum clause be enforced and the transfer granted. 870 F.2d 570. In Alexander
Proudfoot Co., 877 F.2d at 912, however, the court considered a defendant's motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction an action brought in the contractual forum, and
concluded that the effect of the forum selection clause was a substantive matter that
must be analyzed under state law. It thus appears that the Eleventh Circuit has
adopted a rule that would treat issues of venue raised under a forum selection clause as
procedural matters governed by federal law, but would treat issues of jurisdiction raised
under an identical forum clause as substantive questions requiring the application of
state law.
s7 The Courts of Appeals for the Second and Ninth Circuits have held that forum
selection clauses are procedural and, therefore, their enforceability in federal courts
should be decided under federal law. Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 18 (2d Cir.
1990); Manetti-Farrow, 858 F.2d at 512-13; Karl Koch Erecting Co. v. New York
Convention Center Dev. Corp., 838 F.2d 656, 659 (2d Cir. 1988) (diversity action);
Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 1986) (motion to dismiss pendent state
claims); TUC Elecs., Inc. v. Eagle Telephonics, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 35, 37-38 (D.
Conn. 1988) (diversity action); Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc. v. Metz, 566 F.
Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (diversity action). As noted in note 66, supra, the Eleventh
Circuit has taken an ambiguous position on the question. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has noted in dicta that the validity of a forum selection clause is gov-
erned by federal law. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 374 (7th
Cir. 1990).
6s 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1990).
69 487 U.S. 22 (1988), on remand sub nom. In re Ricoh Corp., 870 F.2d 570
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tion to transfer a case pursuant to section 1404(a) from an excluded
federal court to an exclusive contractual forum must be decided under
federal law, even in a diversity action (where state law provides the
substantive rules of decision). 0 Under section 1404(a), a court must
weigh such factors as the convenience of witnesses and the allocation of
the burdens of litigation between the parties. In this analysis, the pres-
ence of a forum selection clause will be a significant, but not a disposi-
tive, factor. 1
As a result, in the unlikely event that it is considerably more con-
venient to try an action under a sovereign debt agreement which selects
a federal court sitting within New York as the contractual forum in a
federal court sitting outside of New York, a federal court could order a
transfer despite the forum selection clause. Moreover, where a sover-
eign debt agreement selects both the courts of New York States as the
exclusive forum and New York law to govern the agreement, a sover-
eign defendant sued in state court may nevertheless be able to remove
the action to federal court and obtain a section 1404(a) transfer, even
though the New York state courts would have no discretion to stay or
dismiss the action. A transfer under section 1404(a) will not change the
governing law. The transferee court will apply the same law that the
transferor court would have employed to decide the case.7
(11th Cir. 1989).
"0 The Ricoh holding is based on the supremacy of federal statutory law over state
law, and the Court emphasized that the enactment of the statute was indicative of
Congressional intent that transfer motions be considered under the standards set forth
in the statute, rather than under any state rules. Ricoh, 487 U.S. at 31. The Court goes
on to note that section 1404(a) is procedural in character. Id. at 31. From the Court's
reasoning, it is not clear, however, what law the Court would have applied had the
defendant made a motion specifically to enforce the forum selection clause and dismiss
the action rather than transfer it. Therefore, Ricoh does not shed any new light on the
split among the circuits as to whether enforcement of a forum selection clause is proce-
dural or substantive in nature.. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
711 Ricoh, 487 U.S. at 29-31. The existence of a forum selection clause shifts the
burden of persuasion to the party opposing enforcement of that clause. Ricoh, 870 F.2d
570 (11th Cir. 1989).
" Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376
U.S. 612 (1964).
The problems of whether enforcement of a forum selection clause is considered a
matter of procedural or substantive law may be of decisive importance. If suit is
brought in violation of an exclusive forum selection clause in the Third Circuit, which
considers the enforcement of forum clauses a question of substantive contract law, pre-
sumably a defendant could remove the case to federal court and then seek a transfer to
the contractual forum. See General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783
F.2d 352, 356-57 (3d Cir. 1986). See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text. How-
ever, if the defendant asks the federal court specifically to enforce the clause by dis-
missing the action, the court will be presented with a question of substantive law and
may look to the law of the state in which it sits. See supra notes 59-67 and accompany-
ing text. If that state does not enforce forum selection clauses, the court could deny the
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(c) Forum Non Conveniens
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a state or federal
court can stay or dismiss an action, notwithstanding a forum selection
clause, when to do so would be "in the interest of substantial justice."
The New York Court of Appeals (the highest New York state court)
explained the doctrine of forum non conveniens as follows:
The burden rests upon the defendant challenging the forum
to demonstrate relevant private or public interest factors
which militate against accepting the litigation, and the court,
after considering and balancing the various competing fac-
tors, must determine in the exercise of its sound discretion
whether to retain jurisdiction or not. Among the factors to be
considered are the burden on the New York courts, the po-
tential hardship to the defendant, and the unavailability of
an alternative forum in which the plaintiff may bring suit.
The court may also consider that both parties to the action
are nonresidents and that the transaction out of which the
cause of action arose occurred primarily in a foreign jurisdic-
tion. No one factor is controlling. The great advantage of the
rule of forum non conveniens is its flexibility based upon the
facts and circumstances of each case.
7
1
Under C.P.L.R. 327(a), a New York state court may, on a party's
motion, stay or dismiss an action which, although jurisdictionally
sound, would "in the interest of substantial justice" be better adjudi-
cated elsewhere.74 New York courts hold, however, that in an action
pursuant to a contract that contains a clause selecting New York as the
forum, the court's discretion should normally be exercised in favor of
retaining jurisdiction.7 5 For example, in Credit Francais International
S.A. v. Sociedad Financiera de Comercio, C.A., 8 the court declined to
dismiss a dispute between two nonresidents, a French bank and a Ven-
motion to dismiss, even though a transfer may have been available on identical facts
under section 1404(a).
73 Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d 474, 479, 467 N.E.2d 245, 247-
48, 478 N.Y.S.2d 597, 599-600 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985) (citations
omitted). The New York Court of Appeals is the highest state court in New York.
7' N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 327(a) (McKinney 1990). For the text of the entire
rule, see supra note 52.
75 Triad Fin. Establishment v. Tumpane Co., 611 F. Supp. 157, 162 (N.D.N.Y.
1985); Arthur Young & Co. v. Leong, 53 A.D.2d 515, 516, 383 N.Y.S.2d 618, 619
(1976), appeal dismissed, 40 N.Y.2d 984, 359 N.E.2d 435, 390 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1976);
Credit Francais Int'l, S.A. v. Sociedad Financiera de Comercio, C.A., 128 Misc. 2d
564, 570, 490 N.Y.S.2d 670, 676 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
7' 128 Misc. 2d at 568, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 674.
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ezuelan financial institution, that resulted from an international loan
agreement that stipulated that New York law would govern and that
any dispute under the agreement could be adjudicated in New York
state or federal courts."
Since 1984, the outcome of forum non conveniens motions in New
York Courts in proceedings based upon contracts differs according to
whether the parties have chosen New York law to govern their agree-
ment and whether section 5-1402 7 is applicable. As noted above, when
section 5-1402 is satisfied, the court no longer has the discretion to
choose whether or not to enforce the forum selection clause. In other
cases, the New York courts will presumably continue to follow the rule
of Bremen.79
Dismissal for forum non conveniens is also available under appro-
priate circumstances in FSIA cases in the federal courts."0 The Su-
preme Court has yet to resolve the general question of whether forum
non conveniens, when raised in the federal courts, is a procedural mat-
ter to which federal law applies, or a substantive matter which may
77 Although Credit Francais was decided in 1985, the action was commenced
before the passage of G.O.L. sections 5-1401 and 5-1402. N.Y. Gw:N. OBLIG. LAW §§
5-1401, 5-1402 (McKinney 1989). Therefore, the case was not decided under the new
statutory provisions, although the court cited them as evidence of New York's policy of
upholding parties' choice of New York law and of a New York forum.
78 Id. at § 5-1402.
7, 407 U.S. 1 (1972). The Bremen standard has been applied by New York state
courts as the New York rule for the enforceability of forum selection agreements. See
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Weir, 131 A.D.2d 380, 381, 517 N.Y.S.2d 141, 142
(1987); Rokeby-Johnson v. Kentucky Agric. Energy Corp., 108 A.D.2d 336, 339-41,
489 N.Y.S.2d 69, 72-74 (1985); Arthur Young, 53 A.D.2d at 516, 383 N.Y.S.2d at
619; Credit Francais, 128 Misc. 2d at 568, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 674.
" The Supreme Court has stated in dictum that the FSIA leaves traditional fo-
rum non conveniens doctrine in place. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Virginia, 461
U.S. 480, 490 n.15 (1983). See also Proyecfin de Venezuela, S.A. v. Banco Industrial
de Venezuela, S.A., 760 F.2d 390, 394 (2d Cir. 1985).
Dismissal of an FSIA action on the grounds of forum non conveniens may be
available when the dispute is between non-United States parties and bears no substan-
tial relationship to the United States. As reflected in the FSIA's legislative history,
Congress was concerned that the courts of the United States might be indiscriminately
used for every dispute between a foreign plaintiff and a foreign sovereign. Rather than
restrict the class of potential plaintiffs under the FSIA, Congress generally limited the
class of actions that might be brought thereunder to those with "some form of substan-
tial contact with the United States." Verlinden at 490. The Supreme Court has noted
that the FSIA's grant of jurisdiction whenever a foreign sovereign has waived its immu-
nity is an exception to the general requirement of substantial contact with the United
States. The Court suggested that, in the absence of any other contact with the United
States, such a suit brought in the United States courts might be dismissed for forum
non conveniens. Id. at 490 n.15.
Thus, under certain circumstances, in an action under the FSIA, a dismissal for
forum non conveniens might be proper under federal law, even though it might be
improper in a New York state court under C.P.L.R. 327(b).
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require the application of state law.81 Similarly, the Second Circuit has
not definitively resolved the question. In Weiss v. Reuth,8" the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that federal courts should apply
state law to the question. However, the following year, in Gilbert v.
Gulf Oil Corp.,"s a different panel of the same court held that the fed-
eral courts were not bound to follow the state rule. Since those deci-
sions, rendered more than forty years ago, some federal courts, when
confronted with the issue, have noted that the question remains un-
resolved. 4 Others have held that forum non conveniens presents issues
of procedural law and therefore should be resolved according to federal
rules.8 5 Many of these courts rest their reasoning either upon the pro-
position that forum non conveniens is identical to section 1404(a) in the
federal courts,8" or upon cases that were decided under section
1404(a).81 Therefore, while these courts may reach the proper result, it
is doubtful, in light of Ricoh,88 that their analysis of the issue can be
considered correct. In recent cases, federal courts in New York have
generally applied federal law to forum non conveniens motions without
discussion."9
3' See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 n.13 (1981), reh'g denied,
455 U.S. 928 (1982); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509 (1947) (reserving
judgment on whether New York State or federal standards were controlling, as they
were substantially the same).
: 149 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1945).
83 153 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1946), rev'd on other grounds, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
. Thomson v. Palmieri, 355 F.2d 64, 66 (2d Cir. 1966); Burton v. Exxon Corp.,
536 F. Supp. 617, 625 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
as Ciprari v. Servicos Aereos Cruzeiro do Sul, S.A., 232 F. Supp. 433, 442
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); Shulman v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 152 F. Supp. 833,
835 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). See also Hodson v. A.H. Robins Co., 528 F. Supp. 809, 817
(E.D. Va. 1981), affid, 715 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1983) (citing Fiorenza v. United States
Steel Int'l, Ltd., 311 F. Supp. 117, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) for the proposition that forum
non conveniens is governed by federal law in a federal court).
" Willis v. Weil Pump Co., 222 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1955); Ultra Sucro Co. v.
Illinois Water Treatment Co., 146 F. Supp. 393, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
8 Ciprari, 232 F. Supp. at 442.
487 U.S. 22 (1988).
"In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec., 1984,
809 F.2d 195, 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987);
Chhawchharia v. Boeing Co., 657 F. Supp. 1157, 1159-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). See also
Intel Corp. v. Malaysian Airline Sys., 652 F. Supp. 1101, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
(court implicitly applied federal law standards to the forum non conveniens inquiry,
but noted that it would apply the choice of law rules of the transferor state); 1A J.
MooRE, W. TAGGART, A. VESTAL, J. WICKER & B. RINGLE, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 0.31712] (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE] ("[The
federal courts] should be independent of state doctrines of forum non conveniens, fash-
ioned for courts operating on a state scale. Forum non conveniens is procedural....
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins [sic] does not require conformity by the federal courts to the
practice of the states in this matter.") (citations omitted).
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The Supreme Court's recent holding in Ricoh,90 although not
based .on conflicts of law principles, may be an indication that forum
non conveniens motions in federal court should be decided under fed-
eral law as a matter of procedural law, rather than as a matter of state
substantive law. 1 Forum non conveniens and transfer of venue pursu-
ant to section 1404(a) are analogous doctrines9 2 allowing for the shift-
ing of the venue of an action to a more convenient forum, even though
jurisdiction and venue were proper in the original court.9" Section
1404(a) permits a court to transfer an action to another court in the
federal system, while forum non conveniens allows a court to dismiss an
action which should be brought in another forum when the court lacks
the power to transfer the case to that forum. (Presumably, after such
dismissal the plaintiff would recommence its suit in the appropriate fo-
rum, thus completing the "transfer.") Since the two doctrines serve es-
sentially the same purpose and are generally governed by the same con-
siderations, it would be illogical for the courts to decide section 1404(a)
motions under federal law, but to decide forum non conveniens motions
under state law.94
00 487 U.S. at 28-32.
91 At least one lower court has so interpreted the Ricoh holding. See, e.g., TUC
Elecs., Inc. v. Eagle Telephonics, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 35, 37-38 (D. Conn. 1988).
92 Congress drafted section 1404(a) with reference to the rules governing forum
non conveniens. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 253 (1981), reh'g denied,
455 U.S. 928 (1982) (citing Revisor's note, H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.,
A132 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 2646, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., A127 (1946)). A court, how-
ever, has broader discretion with respect to a section 1404(a) transfer motion than it
has with respect to a forum non conveniens motion. This discretion reflects the fact that
the result of granting the section 1404(a) motion is less harsh; it does not end the action
or alter the governing law, but merely shifts the action to another location. In contrast,
granting a forum non conveniens motion puts an end to the litigation. See id.; Norwood
v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1955).
93 See 1A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 89, at 0.317[2]. ("[Florum
non conveniens is but an aspect of venue.").
" Nevertheless, it should be noted that forum non conveniens differs from a sec-
tion 1404(a) transfer in at least one important respect. When a case is transferred
under section 1404(a), the transferee court decides the case under the same law that the
transferor court would have applied. Ricoh, 487 U.S. 22. However, when an action is
dismissed for forum non conveniens, it must begin again as a new case in a new court,
and that court will, of course, not be bound to apply the law the court that dismissed
the action would have applied. It can be argued, then, that a forum non conveniens
dismissal has such significant substantive consequences that it must be treated as a
matter of substantive law.
A transfer within the federal system under 28 U.S.C. section 1406, which permits
transfer of an action from a court where venue is improper to a court where the action
could properly have been brought, will also result in a change in the governing law. 28
U.S.C. § 1406 (1988). Under section 1406, the transferee court applies its own law to
the action. Nelson v. International Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640, 643 (9th Cir. 1983). A
section 1406 transfer must be considered procedural in the wake of Ricoh, and there-
fore the fact that a forum non conveniens dismissal will result in a change of law is not
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If the courts were to conclude that forum non conveniens is a mat-
ter of substantive law, this would not necessarily preclude the applica-
tion of federal law to such determinations in FSIA cases.95 The FSIA
does not establish new rules of liability but merely provides that a for-
eign state be liable to the same extent as would a private party in like
circumstances.9" Thus, in some instances, the rules of decision in an
FSIA case will be those of state law.9 7 However, the Supreme Court
has noted that the FSIA is to some extent substantive in nature.98 Since
one of the primary objectives of the FSIA is to promote uniformity in
the treatment of actions involving foreign sovereigns,"' it seems likely
that even if forum non conveniens is eventually held to be a matter of
substantive law requiring the application of state rules in diversity ac-
tions, the federal courts would continue to make these determinations
under federal law in FSIA actions.100
If federal law is applied to forum non conveniens determinations
in FSIA actions, either because forum non conveniens is considered
procedural or because federal substantive law is held to govern such
questions under the FSIA, the courts will likely apply the rule of
Bremen to a defendant's motion to dismiss a case brought in the con-
tractual forum on the ground of forum non conveniens, just as they do
in passing on a defendant's motion to dismiss a case brought outside of
that forum. 1 The rule of Bremen is, in essence, a stricter form of
determinative of the substance/procedure question.
In the absence of decisive precedent, the question of whether forum non conveniens
is a doctrine of substantive or of procedural law must be regarded as still open.
" See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
0 28 U.S.C. section 1606 provides in pertinent part: "As to any claim for relief
with respect to which a foreign state is not entitled to immunity..., the foreign state
shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances ... ." 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1988).
'7 For a discussion of the controversy surrounding the application of state substan-
tive law under the FSIA, see Crockett, The Liability of Foreign States: The Role of
Foreign Municipal Law, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 51, 62-64 n.51 (1986).
: Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1983).
' First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S.
611, 622 n.11 (1983); Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 489. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 32, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6631.
100 Most federal courts have thus far applied federal law to the issue in FSIA
cases without any discussion of the issue. See L'Europeene de Banque v. La Republica
de Venezuela, 700 F. Supp. 114, 119-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Hatzlachh Supply, Inc. v.
Savannah Bank of Nigeria, 649 F. Supp. 688, 692-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Crimson Semi-
conductor, Inc. v. Electronum, 629 F. Supp. 903, 908-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Castillo v.
Shipping Corp. of India, 606 F. Supp. 497, 503-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). But see Barkanic
v. Gen. Admin. of Civil Aviation of the People's Republic of China, No. 90-7641 (2d
Cir. Jan. 14, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library) (the FSIA mandates the application of
the forum state's choice of law rules, rather than federal choice of law rules).
101 The federal courts have not indicated that the Bremen standard applies only
when a plaintiff brings suit outside the contractual forum and have applied that stan-
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forum non conveniens analysis since it displaces "normal forum non
conveniens doctrine applicable in the absence of [a forum selection]
clause." 102 The language of Bremen does not distinguish between
plaintiffs' and defendants' attempts to resist the contractual forum,108
and announces a strong preference for upholding a forum selection
clause whenever it is fair to do so: "There are compelling reasons why
a freely negotiated private international agreement, unaffected by
fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power.., should be
given full effect."' 04 There is no obvious reason why this two-level test
dard without comment to a defendant's motion to dismiss a case brought in the contrac-
tual forum. L'Europeene de Banque, 700 F. Supp. at 123; First Interstate Leasing
Serv. v. Sagge, 697 F. Supp. 744, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
102 407 U.S. 1, 6 (1972).
108 In fact, in Bremen, although the action was commenced outside the contractual
forum, the motion was styled, in part, as a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens,
and the Court referred alternatively to specific enforcement of the forum selection
clause, 407 U.S. at 15, and to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Id. at 19.
Gruson has suggested that federal courts hold plaintiffs beginning actions outside
the contractual forum to the harsh Bremen standard when ruling on motions for trans-
fer of the action back to the contractual forum or for dismissal where such transfer is
not available. In contrast, these courts determine motions by defendants for transfer
from the contractual forum by the more relaxed standards of traditional forum non
conveniens. See Gruson, Controlling Site of Litigation, supra note 11, at 36-39.
Gruson's analysis does not, however, distinguish between motions for transfer pursuant
to section 1404(a) and motions for dismissal for forum non conveniens. In each of the
cases he cites to show a court applying a more lenient standard to a defendant, the
motion under consideration was for transfer under section 1404(a). These cases are
thus of limited use in predicting a court's approach to a defendant's motion to dismiss a
case brought in the contractual forum on the ground of forum non conveniens.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Ricoh, 487 U.S. 22 (1988), lends implicit
support to the proposition that the standards for determination of a forum non con-
veniens motion should not vary according to the procedural posture of the case. In
Ricoh, the Court held that the effect of a forum selection clause on a motion to transfer
pursuant to section 1404(a) must always be evaluated under that statute's criteria, and
those criteria do not vary with the procedural posture of the case. 487 U.S. at 32. If
courts apply the same standard to a motion to transfer an action brought outside the
contractual forum into that forum, and a motion to transfer a case brought in the con-
tractual forum to another location, it would be inconsistent to draw a distinction be-
tween the standard of review applied in these two situations on a motion to dismiss for
forum non conveniens and a motion to dismiss as a matter of substantive contract law.
See also Credit Francais Int'l v. Sociedad Financiera de Comercio, C.A., 128
Misc. 2d 564, 568, 490 N.Y.S.2d 670, 674-76 (Sup. Ct. 1985), which suggests that at
least some New York state courts will apply the Bremen test to both a plaintiff's and
defendant's attempts to evade a contractual forum.
104 407 U.S. at 12-13 (footnote omitted). It should be noted, however, that despite
the policy favoring forum selection clauses, in some procedural settings there will be no
right to immediate appeal from a judicial order refusing enforcement of a forum clause.
The United States Supreme Court recently held that denial of a motion to dismiss
based on enforcement of a forum clause selecting an alternate exclusive forum does not
give rise to an immediate right of appeal. That is, it does not satisfy the requirements
of the collateral order exception to the general rule that no appeal may be take from an
interlocutory order. Lauro Lines s.r.l. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989). The Court
rested its holding on the proposition that the right sought to be protected by an immedi-
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- examination of forum non conveniens motions under traditional fac-
tors when the case is not based on a contract containing a forum selec-
tion clause, and examination of such motions under the strict Bremen
factors when it is - should not be used in FSIA cases.
Finally, when a plaintiff brings an action in the courts of a state
other than New York, that state court judge would look to that state's
rules to determine whether to dismiss an action brought in violation of
an exclusive forum clause. Some states do not enforce forum selection
clauses.1 05 However, if suit is brought in those states, a sovereign de-
fendant may remove the action to the federal court sitting in that locale
and move in the federal court for dismissal on the ground of forum non
conveniens or for a transfer under section 1404(a). As discussed above,
a federal court in such a case would likely apply federal law to the
motion to dismiss or transfer, regardless of the law of the state where
the action was commenced, and would most likely enforce the forum
selection clause.106
2.2. Choice of Law Clauses
A court faced with an agreement containing a governing law
clause must determine both the enforceability and the scope of that
clause. That is, the court must decide whether the clause calls for the
application of the whole law of the chosen jurisdiction, including its
ate appeal could be adequately vindicated by appeal following final judgment. For sim-
ilar reasons, denial of a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens cannot be appealed
as of right. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biand, 486 U.S. 517, 527-29 (1988). In contrast, an
order dismissing an action, whether for forum non conveniens, to specifically enforce a
forum selection clause, or for any other reason, is immediately appealable. It is a final
order that puts an end to litigation. See Elfenbein v. Gulf & Western Indus., 590 F.2d
445, 447-49 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Fluor Corp., 436 F.2d 383, 384-85 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 945 (1971); In -re Lidoriki Maritime Corp., 410 F.
Supp. 919, 921 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affid mem. sub nora. Alexopolos v. Lidoriki Maritime
Corp., 547 F.2d 1158 (3d Cir. 1977), affid mem. sub nora. Brian v. Lidoriki Maritime
Corp., 547 F.2d 1159 (3d Cir. 1977), afl'd mein. sub nom. Kutlu v. Lidoriki Maritime
Corp., 547 F.2d 1161 (3d Cir. 1977), affd mem. sub nom. In re Lidoriki Maritime
Corp., 547 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1977), affd mem. sub nom. Pimental v. Lidoriki Mari-
time Corp., 547 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1977), aff'd men. sub nom. Tastekin v. Lidoriki
Maritime Corp., 547 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1977); 9 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 86, at 110. 13[1], 110.13[6].
An order granting or denying transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), however, does
not end the litigation and is therefore not immediately appealable as of right. Mc-
Creary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032, 1034 (3d Cir. 1974).
Thus, the availability of interlocutory review of a judicial order granting or denying
enforcement of a forum clause may depend in part on the procedural devices available
to enforce the clause.
105 See, e.g., Ricoh, 487 U.S. at 30 (Alabama law, if applicable, would not enforce
forum selection clauses providing for out-of-state venues).
106 See supra notes 80-100 and accompanying text.
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choice of law rules, or only for its substantive law. New York state and
federal courts are in agreement that a contractual choice of law clause
will generally be enforced.
10 7
2.2.1. New York Common Law Choice of Law Rules
New York state courts traditionally determine the enforceability of
choice of law clauses under one of three competing conflicts of laws
rules. Under the "reasonable relationship" test, the parties' choice of
law will be upheld as long as the transaction bears a reasonable rela-
tionship to the jurisdiction whose law is selected. 08 Unfortunately there
is no clear test for what constitutes a reasonable relationship to the
jurisdiction.10 9 Moreover, it is not clear to what extent the parties may
validate a choice of law by structuring their transaction to provide con-
tacts with their chosen jurisdiction.10 Thus, this test leads to an unde-
sirable lack of certainty. Furthermore, when faced with a governing
law clause, New York state courts generally apply the reasonable rela-
tionship approach, 1 but in rare instances, a court may follow the
"grouping of contacts" analysis. Under this approach, the substantive
law of the jurisdiction having the most substantial contacts with a
transaction will be held to govern the transaction and the parties' choice
of law will be considered as merely an important contact to be consid-
ered by the court in the balancing process. 12
Similarly, and again in rare instances, a court might follow the
"governmental interest" test, under which the court examines the gov-
ernmental purpose behind each of the conflicting rules of law and ap-
plies the substantive law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest
107 See, e.g., Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 193-95 (2d Cir.
1955); Avant Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribas, 652 F. Supp. 542, 546 n.6 (S.D.N.Y.
1987), affd, 853 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1988); Reger v. National Ass'n of Bedding Mfrs.
Group Ins. Trust Fund, 83 Misc. 2d 527, 543, 372 N.Y.S.2d 97, 117 (Sup. Ct. 1975)
(citing supporting cases).
108 See Reger, 83 Misc. 2d at 538-44, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 112-18. See also Woodling
v. Garrett Corp., 813 F.2d 543, 551 (2d Cir. 1987).
109 See Gruson, Controlling Choice of Law, in SOVEREIGN LENDING: MANAGING
LEGAL RISK 51, 57 (M. Gruson & R. Reisner eds. 1984) [hereinafter Gruson, Con-
trolling Choice of Law].
110 Id. See also Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403, 408
(1927).
"I' See, e.g., A.S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co., 3 N.Y.2d 369, 381-82, 144 N.E.2d
371, 379, 165 N.Y.S.2d 475, 486 (1957); Gambar Enters. Inc. v. Kelly Servs., Inc., 69
A.D.2d 297, 303, 418 N.Y.S.2d 818, 822 (1979); Reger, 83 Misc. 2d at 539-41, 372
N.Y.S.2d at 114.
112 Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 559-60, 175 N.E.2d 441, 443-44, 216
N.Y.S.2d 65, 68-69 (1961). See Triad Fin. Estab. v. Tumpane Co., 611 F. Supp. 157,
162-63 (N.D.N.Y. 1985). See also Gruson, Contractual Choice of Law and Choice of
Forum, supra note 22, at 3 n.16, for a comprehensive list of cases so holding.
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in the application of its law to the particular facts of the case. Under
this test, no weight is given to the parties' own choice of law. 18 Under
these circumstances, it is impossible for parties to be certain of the stan-
dard that will be used to judge the enforceability of a choice of law
clause, and thus impossible to be certain, particularly in complex cases,
that the clause will be effective.
2.2.2. Choice of Law Rules under G.O.L. Section 5-1401
G.O.L. section 5-1401111 now permits parties to an agreement re-
lating to a transaction involving not less than two hundred and fifty
thousand dollars to make an enforceable election to have their agree-
ment governed by New York law "whether or not such contract, agree-
ment, or undertaking bears a reasonable relationship to this state.""1 5
This special provision relates only to cases where New York law is
chosen. Thus, if the parties choose another governing law and litigate
their disputes in the New York state courts, New York courts will pre-
sumably determine the enforceability of that clause under New York's
traditional conflicts principles described above.
The language of section 5-1401 implies that the reasonable rela-
tionship test, rather than the governmental interest or the significant
contacts tests, is the governing standard for the validity of a choice of
law clause in New York. Thus, the statute overrides the reasonable
relationship requirement for agreements that choose New York law
and meet its minimum-value requirement. But, as some cases have sug-
gested, a choice of law clause that meets the reasonable relationship test
may nevertheless be overridden out of deference to policies of either the
forum or another jurisdiction."1 ' Nothing in section 5-1401 necessarily
prohibits such action by a court. Rather, although no court has yet
done so, section 5-1401 could be read to reflect a strong New York
policy to be weighed in the balance, but not an absolute requirement
that a court uphold a contractual choice of New York law in all situa-
tions where the statutory standard is met. 117 Thus, it remains theoreti-
'13 See Triad Fin. Estab., 611 F. Supp. at 162; J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grin-
dlays Bank (Uganda), Ltd., 37 N.Y.2d 220, 226-27, 333 N.E.2d 168, 172, 371
N.Y.S.2d 892, 898-99, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975); Intercontinental Planning,
Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 372, 382, 248 N.E.2d 576, 580-82, 300 N.Y.S.2d
817, 824-25 (1969).
114 N.Y. GEN. OBUIG. LAW § 5-1401 (McKinney 1989). For the text of this stat-
ute, see supra note 25.
115 Id.
11' Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 1955).
7 In this regard, section 5-1401 differs significantly from section 5-1402, with its
corresponding C.P.L.R. 327(b) enforcement mechanism. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R.
327(b) (McKinney 1990). See supra note 51. One result of such a holding could be
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cally possible that even under the new statute, a court following New
York choice of law rules might refuse to enforce a choice of New York
law for policy reasons. 1 8
2.2.3. State v. Federal Choice of Law Rules
There is some controversy over whether federal courts should de-
termine the enforceability of a choice of law clause under state or fed-
eral conflicts rules when jurisdiction is premised on the FSIA." 9 The
language of the FSIA provides no clear answer to the question, and the
courts have yet to conclusively resolve it. In First National City Bank
v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba,2° the Supreme Court
stated in dictum that the FSIA did not require the application of state
conflicts rules, even though the FSIA might mandate the application of
state rules of liability in some circumstances.' 2 ' In that case, the Court
applied federal choice of law principles.' 22 Lower federal courts have
applied both federal and state choice of law rules in federal question
cases. In Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales
Corp.,2' for example, the court applied federal choice of law princi-
ples 24 in a contract action. In that case, the court's jurisdiction was
that, in a case where the parties had chosen New York State law pursuant to section 5-
1401, and the requirements of section 5-1402 were met but public policy prevented the
application of New York State law, the New York state courts would nevertheless be
precluded from dismissing the case for forum non conveniens under C.P.L.R. 327(b).
Under such circumstances, the court would retain the case but apply whatever law was
applicable under standard choice of law rules.
118 See Triad Fin. Estab. v. Tumpane Co., 611 F. Supp. 157, 162-66 (N.D.N.Y.
1985) (under pre-1984 law, the court refused to enforce a sales agency contract that
was valid under New York law and which contained a choice of law clause calling for
application of New York law. This refusal occurred because the contract violated a
Saudi Arabian decree which prohibited the payment of any agent's commission in con-
nection with the sale of arms, and Saudi Arabia had a materially greater interest in the
controversy).
119 See Gruson, Controlling Choice of Law, supra note 109, at 52-53.
'so 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
121 Id. at 622 n.11.
122 Id. at 621-23.
12s 629 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
12 Gruson has suggested that the court in Venezolana applied New York choice
of law principles to validate the parties' choice of law as applied to one set of issues in
this case. See Gruson, Controlling Choice of Law, supra note 109, at 53. The Venezo-
lana court's language on the point is not clear, but it seems more probable that it
applied federal choice of law rules. The court stated explicitly that, as this was not a
diversity case, it was not bound to follow state choice of law rules, and explicitly fol-
lowed federal rules to choose a governing law as to a second set of issues in the case.
Venezolana, 629 F.2d at 795. As to the first set of issues, the court stated: "Since there
are enough contacts with New York to validate the parties' choice of New York law as
governing under any choice of law analysis, we need not reach the question of what
jurisdiction's law would be applied if a serious challenge to the parties' ability to choose
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founded on the Edge Act, 25 which, like the FSIA, grants the courts
federal question jurisdiction.126 However, in Barkanic,227 the court ap-
plied state choice of law rules in a FSIA action. At least one federal
court outside of New York has followed Venezolana and applied fed-
eral choice of law rules in FSIA actions.
1 2 8
Federal choice of law rules, which are very similar to New York's
traditional conflicts of law rules, generally give effect to a governing
law provision. In the seminal case of Siegelman v. Cunard White Star,
Ltd., " the court noted that federal conflicts law will give effect to the
parties' intent with respect to governing law as long as the law chosen
is that of a jurisdiction that bears a reasonable relationship to the trans-
action and its application does not contravene an important policy of an
interested state.130 Federal courts, therefore, will still look for some re-
lationship with the chosen state. Hence, they will not always enforce a
choice of New York law that would be binding upon the New York
state courts under section 5-1401.
In any case where the parties to an agreement have made a valid
choice of governing law, the court must determine whether their choice
refers to the whole law of the chosen jurisdiction, including its choice of
New York law could be mounted." Id. at 794-95. In light of the court's comments
about the applicability of federal choice of law rules, it seems more reasonable to read
this language to mean that it found it unnecessary to decide what the federal standard
for evaluating a choice of law clause should be, not that it was unnecessary to choose
between state and federal choice of law rules.
13 12 U.S.C. § 632 (1989). The Edge Act grants federal jurisdiction over "all
suits of a civil nature... to which any corporation organized under the laws of the
United States shall be a party, arising out of transactions involving international or
foreign banking.. .." Id.
120 Venezolana, 629 F.2d at 795.
127 Barkanic v. Gen. Admin. of Civil Aviation of the People's Republic of China,
No. 90-7641 (2d Cir. Jan. 14, 1991) (LEXIS, Genfed library).
1" Harris v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 820 F.2d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 1987).
2- 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955).
120 Id. at 195. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187
(1971) (cited in Harris, 820 F.2d at 1003, as a source of federal choice-of-law princi-
ples). The Restatement provides, in pertinent part:
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contrac-
tual rights and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one
which the parties could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their
agreement directed to that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the par-
ties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the
parties' choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary
to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater
interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular
issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the
applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the
parties.
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law rules, or whether it refers to the substantive law only. 31 Although
there is no decisive New York precedent on the question, 3 ' common
sense and what authority there is on the point both suggest that such a
clause should be held to refer only to the substantive law of the chosen
jurisdiction. As this Article surely illustrates, specification of any juris-
diction's choice of law rules will not necessarily give the parties the
advantages of predictability and clarity that are the major reasons for
making a contractual choice of law. Recognizing this, the court in Sie-
gelmanl ss held that the contractual choice of English law referred to
the substantive law of England, "for surely the major purpose of in-
cluding the provision in the ticket was to assure Cunard of a uniform
result in any litigation no matter ...where the litigation arose, and
this result might not obtain if the 'whole' law of England were referred
to."'" Moreover, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which
has been cited with approval in both New York state and federal
cases,135 suggests that only the substantive law of the chosen jurisdiction
should be applied. 3 It therefore seems likely that either a federal court
131 This is the question of the applicability of the conflicts-of-laws doctrine known
as renvoi. The court explained, in Reger v. National Ass'n of Bedding Mfrs. Group
Ins. Trust Fund, 83 Misc. 2d 527, 543, 372 N.Y.S.2d 97, 117 (Sup. Ct. 1975), that
"[t]he process of referring back to the foreign jurisdiction's conflict of laws rules is
known as renvoi-the doctrine of remission, whereby the forum State looks to the
whole law of the foreign jurisdiction .... ." The difficulties caused by the application of
renvoi may be easily illustrated. If two California citizens make a contract which con-
tains a provision selecting New York law and which does not satisfy the requirements
of G.O.L. cection 5-1401, and suit is later brought on the agreement in a California
court, that court, assuming it recognizes the governing law provision as valid, will have
to decide whether to apply renvoi. If it were to do so, it might well conclude that a
New York court, applying New York's reasonable relationship test to the governing
law provision, would invalidate the governing law clause and apply California's sub-
stantive law to the action. The California court, then, would by application of New
York's whole law, decide the dispute under California's substantive law-hardly the
result the parties are likely to have anticipated when they stipulated the law of New
York.
13 See Gruson, Controlling Choice of Law, supra note 109, at 62.
138 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955).
184 Id. at 194.
135 Harris v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 820 F.2d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 1987); Reger,
83 Misc. 2d at 539, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
136 The RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNFLirT OF LAWS provides:
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contrac-
tual rights and duties will be applied....
(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of intention, the reference
is to the local law of the state of the chosen law.
Comment h elaborates:
The reference, in the absence of a contrary indication of intention, is
to the "local law" of the chosen state and not to that state's "law," which
means the totality of its law including its choice-of-law rules. When they
choose the state which is to furnish the law governing the validity of their
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or a New York court would apply only the substantive law of a chosen
jurisdiction when presented with a valid choice of law clause.
3. DOES THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976
PROVIDE A DEFENSE TO A SOVEREIGN DEBTOR IN AN ACTION
COMMENCED IN THE UNITED STATES?
3.1. Jurisdiction over a Foreign State Under the FSIA
The FSIA provides that "a foreign state shall be immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as
provided in sections 1605 and 1607 of this chapter. ' 1 3 7 Those sections
specifically authorize a foreign state to waive such immunity "either
explicitly or by implication."" 8 Sovereign debt agreements virtually al-
ways contain an express provision which conditions the extension of
credit upon the borrower's waiving its sovereign immunity to the full
extent permitted under the FSIA. Thus, the immunity from jurisdiction
granted to sovereigns by the FSIA does not provide a sovereign debtor
with a defense to an action commenced in any court in the United
States for repayment of a debt due under such an agreement.1"' Ac-
cordingly, a court typically will be able to adjudicate claims against a
sovereign debtor to the same extent it can adjudicate claims against any
other defendant, subject to the procedural rules discussed in section
1.*4° Only in those rare instances where an enforceable waiver of sover-
eign immunity is not contained in a sovereign debt agreement will a
court be required to go through the analysis of whether the sovereign
has lost its immunity by reason of the application of any of the debated
provisions of sections 1605 and 1607 of the FSIA.
141
3.2. Attachment and Execution Under the FSIA: An Overview
To enforce a judgment entered against a sovereign debtor in the
contract, the parties almost certainly have the "local law," rather than the
"law," of that state in mind. To apply the "law" of the chosen state would
introduce the uncertainties of choice of law into the proceedings and would
serve to defeat the basic objectives, namely those of certainty and predict-
ability, which the choice-of-law provision was designed to achieve.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 comment h (1971) (citations
omitted).
237 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (Supp. 1990).
18 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)(Supp. 1990).
18 Moreover, such waiver of jurisdictional immunity is also likely to be an effec-
tive waiver of any immunity the sovereign may have in any other foreign jurisdiction
where an action could be commenced.
1'0 See supra notes 3-10 and accompanying text.
141 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1607 (Supp. 1990).
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event it is not voluntarily paid, or to ensure that any eventual judgment
will be satisfied, a creditor may seek to effectuate either prejudgment
attachment or post-judgment attachment (or execution), of assets of the
debtor located in the United States or elsewhere. Although, as discussed
above, sovereign immunity typically will not provide an effective de-
fense to the entry of an adverse judgment against a sovereign debtor, it
may effectively prevent enforcement of such a judgment. It should be
noted, however, that even if the judgment is not enforceable against the
defendant's assets, it may have onerous negative repercussions for the
sovereign debtor. For example, the judgment may constitute a cross-
default under the debtor's various loan agreements.
The FSIA provides that "the property in the United States of a
foreign state shall be immune from attachment[,I arrest and execu-
tion, ' 142 subject to the exceptions set forth in the FSIA and to "existing
international agreements" to which the United States was a party at
the time of enactment of the FSIA in 1976.143 Section 1610(a) of the
FSIA creates an exception to this general rule, and provides that prop-
erty of a government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality that
is "used for a commercial activity in the United States" and as to
which there has been a waiver of immunity, is not immune from execu-
tion after judgment. 14 In addition, section 1610(b) of the FSIA pro-
vides that property of a governmental agency or instrumentality other
than the government itself (and other than a central bank acting for its
own account, to which special rules apply) which is "engaged in com-
mercial activity in the United States" is not immune from execution
after judgment either (a) where the agency or instrumentality has
waived immunity, or (b) where the judgment relates to a claim based
on the agency's or instrumentality's commercial activity in the United
States. 45 Finally, section 1611(b)(1) of the FSIA provides a specific
immunity from post-judgment attachment for property of a central
bank or monetary authority "held for its own account" unless there has
been an "explicit" waiver of immunity by the central bank or parent
government.1 46 This latter provision is particularly relevant since it is
often a foreign state's "central bank or monetary authority" which is
designated either as a borrower or as a guarantor under the foreign
state's loan agreements, and whose assets, therefore, may be looked to
in order to satisfy any judgment rendered thereunder.
141 Id. § 1609.
148 Id. § 1604.
l Id. § 1610(a).
145 Id. § 1610(b).
146 Id. § 1611(b)(1). See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
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In addition to these general rules regarding post-judgment attach-
ment and execution, section 1610(d) of the FSIA provides for prejudg-
ment attachment of commercial property of a foreign state located in
the United States where there has been an "explicit" waiver of immu-
nity to prejudgment attachment (i.e., a waiver that refers specifically to
prejudgment attachment). 4 This provision probably does not apply to
the property of a foreign central bank held for its own account, as it is
likely to be considered absolutely immune from prejudgment attach-
ment, though not from post-judgment attachment or execution, even if
the central bank purports explicitly to have waived such immunity.
3.3. Prejudgment Attachment
3.3.1. Prejudgment Attachment Generally
Prejudgment attachment is a procedure by which, prior to adjudi-
cation on the merits of a case, a court may order the seizure of a por-
tion of the defendant's assets to secure satisfaction of a judgment that
may ultimately be given. The standards governing the granting of an
order of prejudgment attachment, as well as other provisional remedies
in either federal or state court, are governed by state law""8 and will
therefore vary by jurisdiction. 49
Notwithstanding such state rules allowing prejudgment attach-
ment, the FSIA grants foreign sovereign debtors certain immunities
147 S & S Mach. Co. v. Masinexportimport, 706 F.2d 411, 413-18 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 850 (1983).
148 FED R. Crv. P. 64.
14' For example, in an action pending in a state or federal court in New York
State:
An order of attachment may be granted in any action ... where the
plaintiff has demanded and would be entitled, in whole or in part, or in
the alternative, to a money judgment against one or more defendants,
when:
1. the defendant is a nondomiciliary residing without the state, or is
a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in the state; or
2. the defendant resides or is domiciled in the state and cannot be
personally served despite diligent efforts to do so; or
3. the defendant, with intent to defraud his creditors or frustrate
the enforcement of a judgment that might be rendered in plaintiff's
favor, has assigned, disposed of, encumbered or secreted property, or
removed it from the state or is about to do any of these acts; or
4. the cause of action is based on a judgment, decree or order of a
court of the United States or of any other court which is entitled to
full faith and credit in this state, or on a judgment which qualifies
for recognition under the provisions of article 53.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 6201 (McKinney 1980). Since a sovereign debtor is consid-
ered a non-domiciliary residing outside the state of New York, absent immunity, its
assets located in New York would normally be subject to prejudgment attachment.
1991]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
from prejudgment attachment. Section 1610(d) of the FSIA provides
that property "used for a commercial activity in the United States"
(other than central bank property held for the central bank's own ac-
count, which is governed by a special rule) is not immune from pre-
judgment attachment if such immunity has been "explicitly waived.
' 150
In their loan agreements, in addition to waiving any sovereign immu-
nity as to jurisdiction, foreign sovereign debtors typically explicitly
waive any immunity from prejudgment attachment within the meaning
of this provision. This waiver would therefore render all of the sover-
eign debtor's commercial assets151 subject to prejudgment attachment,
and would also subject to prejudgment attachment any commercial as-
sets of a central bank not "held for its own account." In this regard, the
FSIA expressly provides that the following assets are not subject to pre-
judgment attachment (nor to post-judgment attachment or execution)
under any circumstances: (1) property of certain designated organiza-
tions such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank to
the extent that attachment would "imped[e] the disbursement of funds
to, or on the order of, a foreign state," and (2) certain property used or
intended to be used in connection with military activity. 52
In addition to the legal rules governing prejudgment attachment of
a sovereign debtor's assets, a number of practical considerations regard-
ing prejudgment attachment merit discussion. In state and federal
courts in New York and in the United States generally, when an action
is commenced, an order of prejudgment attachment may be obtained
against assets located in the jurisdiction without prior notice to the
party whose assets are seized.15 Thus, if a court sitting in New York
were to grant an ex parte order of prejudgment attachment against a
sovereign debtor's assets, which would include all of its bank accounts
150 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d) (Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
151 The "commercial" status of a given asset will be evaluated by the "nature" of
the activity for which it is being used, rather than by the purpose of the activity from
the viewpoint of the foreign government. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (Supp. 1990). See H.R.
REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN.
NEws 6604, 6615. This standard is often difficult to apply in practice. In one case, for
instance, execution was permitted on a foreign embassy's bank account because it was
used in part to pay for various "commercial" goods and services such as the hiring of
American clerical staff. See Birch Shipping Corp. v. Embassy of the United Republic of
Tanzania, 507 F. Supp. 311 (D.D.C. 1980). The better view, however, is that embassy
bank accounts should be immune from execution even if they are used partly for com-
mercial activities in connection with running the embassy. Liberian E. Timber Corp. v.
Government of the Republic of Liberia, 659 F. Supp. 606 (D.D.C. 1987) (dicta).
152 28 U.S.C. §§ 1611(a), 1611(b)(2)(1988); International Organizations Immuni-
ties Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1988).
153 Conversely, if a lender were to commence an action against a defendant in a
jurisdiction other than New York, it could not obtain prejudgment attachment of assets
of the defendant located in New York.
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in the State of New York, the order could be served on all commercial
banks in New York, as well as on the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York ("FRBNY"), and on any other potential garnishee in New York
(i.e., an investment bank), before the sovereign borrower was advised
that the order had been granted. Upon receipt of the order, a commer-
cial bank, the FRBNY, investment bank, or other garnishee would be
required to give custody to the sheriff of all of that defendant's ac-
counts, including any monies transferred into such an account between
the time of receipt of the order and the time that payment to the sheriff
was actually made. In other words, until such time as the order of at-
tachment were vacated, the defendant would not only lose control over
the assets attached, but would also be greatly hampered, if not totally
precluded, from conducting financial transactions with banks in New
York.
In order to obtain an ex parte order of prejudgment attachment of
assets of a sovereign or other debtor, a creditor would have to convince
a court that it "would be entitled, in whole or in part, or in the alterna-
tive, to a money judgment against [the defendant]" and that "the de-
fendant is a non-domiciliary residing without the state, or is a foreign
corporation not authorized to do business in the state. . ." " Formal
notice to the party whose assets have been attached, and judicial consid-
eration of whether the order of attachment should be confirmed or va-
cated (for reasons of sovereign immunity or otherwise), occurs after the
prejudgment attachment has been made. It is therefore possible for a
creditor to obtain a prejudgment attachment that is legally improper
(because, for example, it attaches non-commercial property of the de-
fendant, central bank assets "held for its own account," or property of
some other state agency or instrumentality that is not a party to the
agreements) and nevertheless be able to tie up the assets involved for a
period of weeks or even months until a court rules on the propriety of
the attachment.
A factor that militates against a plaintiff seeking an order of pre-
judgment attachment, at least in courts sitting in New York, is the rule
that a creditor found to have wrongfully attached property is subject to
absolute liability for all injuries flowing from the wrongful attach-
ment. 55 This threat of liability for wrongful attachment, without re-
gard to the reasonableness of the creditor's actions, would tend to deter
unwarranted attachments. In particular, in light of the fairly clear pro-
hibition against such attachments under the FSIA with respect to prop-
15 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 6201 (McKinney 1980).
'5 FED. R. Civ. P. 64; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 6212(e) (McKinney 1980).
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erty held for the central bank's own account, the threat of liability for
wrongful attachment would tend to discourage prejudgment attachment
of central bank property.
3.3.2. Immunity For Foreign Central Bank Assets "Held For Its
Own Account"
As noted above, the property of foreign central banks is subject to
a special rule contained in section 1611(b)(1) of the FSIA:15"
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1610 of this chap-
ter, the property of a foreign state shall be immune from
attachment and from execution, if-
(1) the property is that of a foreign central bank
or monetary authority held for its own account, unless
such bank or authority, or its parent foreign govern-
ment, has explicitly waived its immunity from attach-
ment in aid of execution, or from execution, notwith-
standing any withdrawal of the waiver which the bank,
authority or government may purport to effect except in
accordance with the terms of the waiver .... 157
The special rule contained in section 1611(b)(1) for central bank
property thus differs from the rule applicable to property of other for-
eign governmental entities in two important respects. First, the criterion
for immunity under section 1611(b)(1) is whether the property is that
(i) "of a foreign central bank" which is (ii) "held for its own account,"
rather than merely whether the property is "used for a commercial ac-
tivity." Second, although the general rule of section 1610 permits a for-
eign state to waive prejudgment attachment as well as post-judgment
'" According to Ernest Patrikis (Executive Vice-President and General Counsel
of the FRBNY, but not purporting to be enunciating FRBNY policy on this issue), the
reasons for granting special treatment to the property of foreign central banks are: (1)
foreign central banks typically invest a large portion of their reserves in foreign cur-
rency obligations, particularly United States dollar obligations, because of the large and
relatively stable United States financial market; (2) the removal of large amounts of
foreign central bank funds from the United States could have an "immediate and ad-
verse effect on the U.S. balance of payments;" (3) "the removal of that portion of for-
eign central bank reserves invested in U.S. government securities could seriously affect
that nation's ability to manage the public debt;" and (4) U.S. foreign relations could be
adversely affected by prejudgment attachment of foreign central bank assets. Patrikis,
Immunity of Central Bank Assets Under US Law, in SOVEREIGN LENDING: MANAG-
ING LEGAL RisK 89 (M. Gruson & R. Reisner eds. 1984). See also H.R. REP. No.
1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
6604, 6630.
257 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
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attachment, section 1611(b)(1) speaks only of the waiver by foreign
central banks of post-judgment attachment. Accordingly, although com-
mentators have questioned the intent of Congress, most agree that the
language in section 1611(b)(1) means that foreign central banks cannot
effectively waive immunity from prejudgment attachment for property
held for their own account.
158
Under these standards, the immunity of a central bank's assets
from prejudgment attachment hinges upon whether such assets are held
for the central bank's "own account." This concept is not defined in the
FSIA and has not been the subject of any significant judicial interpreta-
tion. 159 The legislative history of the FSIA, however, suggests that it
refers to property used by a foreign central bank to conduct its central
bank activities. A letter from the United States Department of Justice
and Department of State to the President of the United States Senate
analyzing section 1611(b)(1) of the FSIA states in part that:
Section 1611(b)(1) applies to funds of a foreign central bank
• . . which are deposited in the United States and "held" for
the bank's . . . "own account"-i.e., funds used or held in
connection with central banking activities, as distinguished
from funds used solely to finance the commercial transac-
tions of other entities or of foreign states.18 0
Central banking activities would clearly include the custody and
management of a country's international monetary assets, including for-
eign exchange, gold, and foreign securities. If circumstances were to
arise in which the ownership of assets held by a central bank in the
United States might be subject to question (i.e., if a central bank were
itself merely a custodian) or if a central bank held assets in the United
States in connection with activities which might arguably be character-
ized as something other than ordinary central banking activities (i.e., if
"'8 Banque Compafina v. Banco de Guatemala, 583 F. Supp. 320, 322-23
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (dictum); Nichols, Sovereign Debtors Under US Immunity Law, in
SOVEREIGN LENDING: MANAGING LEGAL RIsx 81, 85-86 (M. Gruson & R. Reisner
eds. 1984); Patrikis, supra note 156, at 94; Brower, Bistline & Loomis, The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 in Practice, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 200, 209 (1979).
But see Nichols, The Impact of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act on the Enforce-
ment of Lenders' Remedies, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 251, 260 (although the FSIA fails to
validate a central bank's explicit waiver of its immunity from prejudgment attachment,
"it is difficult to see why a court should decline to hold a central bank to its bargain on
this point").
'59 One case notes in passing that letters of credit may not constitute assets of a
central bank held for its own account, but does not discuss the issue in any meaningful
way. Werner Lehara Int'l, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 484 F. Supp. 65, 75
(W.D. Mich. 1980).
160 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6630.
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a central bank were holding funds of other public sector or private enti-
ties in connection with issuing or confirming commercial letters of
credit on their behalf), it would be necessary to examine closely the
relevant facts and circumstances before a court could conclude that such
assets were immune from attachment.
Were a court to hold that the special provisions of section
1611(b)(1) do not apply to a central bank's assets because, for example,
the assets in question were not held in connection with normal central
bank activities, then the general rules of section 1610(d) mentioned
above would apply. Under these rules, a central bank's waiver of im-
munity from prejudgment attachment would be effective as to property
"used for a commercial activity in the United States. "16 1
It should be emphasized that even central bank assets held for "its
own account" would still be subject to post-judgment attachment (or
execution) to the extent that a central bank had explicitly waived its
immunity from post-judgment attachment in accordance with section
1611(b) of the FSIA.
3.4. Remedies Similar to Prejudgment Attachment
Attachment is not the only remedy to which a resourceful creditor
may resort in order to gain control over a debtor's property. Court-
ordered provisional remedies such as preliminary injunctions or tempo-
rary restraining orders, as well as the self-help remedy of set-off fre-
quently used by banks, have the same practical effect as prejudgment
attachment. That is, debtors lose control of the funds affected by the
remedy until there has been an adjudication of the merits of the contro-
versy by a court. However, although the FSIA does not expressly limit
the use of such remedies, commentators and courts have concluded that,
at least in certain circumstances, the provisions and policies of the
FSIA may limit the availability of such alternative remedies.
Injunctions and temporary restraining orders can only be imposed
by court order. Hence, these remedies are similar in nature to prejudg-
ment attachment. A court should recognize the policies behind the im-
munity from prejudgment attachment accorded foreign central banks by
the FSIA and should not enjoin a central bank from removing assets
from the court's jurisdiction that are immune from prejudgment attach-
ment. On the other hand, courts can probably be expected to give effect
to non-judicial remedies such as a bank's right of set-off without regard
to the provisions of the FSIA.
161 28 U.S.C. § 1610(d) (1988).
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3.4.1. Preliminary 'Injunctions And Temporary Restraining
Orders
An injunction is an equitable remedy whereby a court orders a
party to do or not to do a specific act. For example, if a central bank
debtor had funds on deposit with a New York bank, a creditor of the
central bank might, under appropriate circumstances, seek to obtain an
injunction from a court in New York forbidding the central bank from
removing its funds from the New York bank. The practical effect of
such an injunction, like that of prejudgment attachment, would be to
ensure that assets of the central bank within the jurisdiction of the
court at the outset of litigation would remain there and be available to
satisfy any judgment that might ultimately be rendered against the cen-
tral bank. An injunction can only be issued after a hearing which gives
each party the opportunity to argue why the injunction should or
should not be issued.
A temporary restraining order is similar to an injunction except
that it is only granted for the limited period of time necessary to deter-
mine the appropriateness of granting an injunction. Under certain cir-
cumstances, a court may grant a temporary restraining order without
notice to the defendant if the plaintiff can demonstrate that immediate
and irreparable injury will result unless the defendant is restrained
before a hearing can be held.1 62 However, unlike prejudgment attach-
ments, which are routinely granted ex parte in New York state courts
(and to a lesser degree in New York federal courts), federal judges in
New York will not grant ex parte temporary restraining orders except
under the most extraordinary circumstances.
The question therefore arises whether the protections afforded a
foreign sovereign debtor under the FSIA apply with the same force to a
creditor seeking to enjoin a debtor from moving its assets outside the
jurisdiction, as they do to a creditor seeking to attach those assets at the
outset of litigation. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that a Romanian trading company that was protected from
prejudgment attachment by the FSIA could likewise not be enjoined
from drawing under certain irrevocable letters of credit opened in its
favor. The court stated:
The FSIA would become meaningless if courts could eviscer-
ate its protections merely by denominating their restraints as
injunctions against the negotiation or use of property rather
than as attachments of that property. We hold that courts in
16* FED. R. Crv. P. 65(b).
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this context may not grant, by injunction, relief which they
may not provide by attachment.16
Further discussion of the limitations the FSIA places on all court
ordered provisional remedies is found in S & S Mach. Co. v.
Masinexportimport16" 4 and Raji v. Bank Sepah-Iran.6 5 Although these
cases were decided under section 1610(d) of the FSIA (and not under
section 1611(b), since a central bank was not involved), the conclusion
of the two courts should also be applicable to the latter section based on
the purposes behind the FSIA. First, the reasons for giving the assets of
foreign central banks special treatment as regards prejudgment attach-
ment-encouraging foreign central banks to maintain deposits in the
United States and avoiding an adverse effect on United States foreign
relations-apply with equal force to other court-ordered provisional
remedies. Second, section 1602 of the FSIA, the findings and declara-
tion of purpose section of the statute, refers to "determination[s] by
United States courts" generally, and does not distinguish between par-
ticular remedies granted by United States courts. Third, the legislative
history of section 1610(d) of the FSIA, which relates to prejudgment
attachment of the property of a foreign state used for a commercial
activity in the United States, suggests that section 1610(d) applies to all
court-ordered provisional remedies used to prevent assets from being
dissipated or removed from a jurisdiction to frustrate satisfaction of a
judgment. By analogy, section 1611(b), which specifically addresses at-
tachment of foreign central bank assets, should also apply to all court-
ordered provisional remedies.
Despite the argument that prejudgment attachment should not be
distinguished from other provisional remedies, a number of federal dis-
trict courts outside of the Second Circuit, in cases involving claims
against Iran (which arose during the 1979-80 "hostage crisis"), have
nevertheless made such a distinction. Perhaps largely because of the
political context in which they arose, these courts held that such other
provisional remedies are permitted under the FSIA. 66 The reasoning
168 S & S Mach. Co. v. Masinexportimport, 706 F.2d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 850 (1983). A New York state trial court in Manhattan has
come to the same conclusion. See Raji v. Bank Sepah-Iran, 131 Misc. 2d 158, 495
N.Y.S.2d 576, 581 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (because the Iranian bank had not waived immu-
nity from prejudgment attachment under section 1610(d), the court was barred by
FSIA from granting an injunction, as well as an order for prejudgment attachment).
16 706 F.2d 411.
163 131 Misc. 2d 158, 495 N.Y.S.2d 576.
168 See American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (preliminary injunction granted to prevent removal of Iranian govern-
ment assets from United States in case claiming expropriation of property located in
Iran); Pfizer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 80-2791 (D.D.C. Nov. 26, 1980) (FSIA
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of these cases has not been followed to date, and it is not clear whether
courts will do so in the future, absent an unusual political context such
as that in which the Iranian cases arose. In any event, in any suit
brought in a federal court in New York, Second Circuit precedent
would be controlling on procedural issues, such as attachment and in-
junction. The assets of a central bank on deposit with the FRBNY or a
commercial bank should therefore be immune from preliminary injunc-
tions or temporary restraining orders to the extent that such assets
would enjoy immunity from prejudgment attachment.
3.4.2. Bank's Right of Set-Off
In addition to the remedies discussed above, a creditor bank may
be able to unilaterally set off deposits it holds in the name of a debtor
and apply them against sums due to such bank from that debtor under
its debt agreements. 1 7 Although there is no case law on point, it is far
from clear that a court would find the FSIA to be a bar against any
right of set-off which a creditor could otherwise assert against the for-
eign sovereign borrower. The FSIA by its terms does not confer any
explicit immunity from set-off for assets held in the United States by
either foreign states generally or by foreign central banks in particular,
nor does the statute explicitly mention set-off. However, section 1607(c)
of the FSIA and its legislative history indicate that in enacting the
FSIA, Congress was aware of banks' traditional set-off rights and
wished to preserve those rights unencumbered by sovereign immunity
claims. Accordingly, section 1607(c) provides that United States courts
will not grant immunity to foreign states with respect to a counterclaim
"to the extent that the counterclaim does not seek relief exceeding in
amount or differing in kind from that sought by the foreign state." '
does not bar courts from ordering preliminary injunctions which differ from prejudg-
ment attachments in that they run against persons and not property); Electronic Data
Sys. Corp. Iran v. Social Sec. Org. of Iran, No. CA3-79-218-F (N.D. Tex. June 21,
1979) (preliminary injunction granted for equitable reason of preventing meaningless
judgment and because preliminary injunction, unlike prejudgment attachment, does not
purport to confer property rights); Chas. T. Main Int'l, Inc. v. Khuzestan Water &
Power Auth., No. 79-2304-C (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 1979) (court rejected claim that FSIA
limits its inherent injunctive powers and granted preliminary injunction preventing dis-
position of defendant's U.S. property in case claiming non-payment for services).
167 In New York, the only prerequisite to exercise of the right of set-off (which
can arise under common law, contract or statute) is the giving of notice to the depositor
pursuant to section 9-g of the New York Banking Law. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 9-g
(McKinney Supp. 1988). The notice may be given by mail prior to or on the same day
that the set-off occurs, and need only notify the depositor of the exercise of the right of
set-off and state the reason therefor. Therefore, as a practical matter, such notice would
be received by the depositor only after a bank has exercised its right of set-off.
16 28 U.S.C. § 1607(c) (1988).
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The legislative history of section 1607(c) indicates that this provision
was designed to "codif[y] the rule enunciated [by the United States Su-
preme Court] in National City Bank v. Republic of China."'1 9 In that
case, China sued a United States bank for $200,000 in deposits that the
bank had refused to pay to China because the bank had used the de-
posit to set-off $1.6 million in defaulted Chinese treasury notes. The
Supreme Court upheld the set-off, holding that the bank's counter-
claim, up to the amount of China's claim, was not barred by China's
assertion of sovereign immunity.
70
Notwithstanding section 1607(c)'s recognition of counterclaims, it
might be argued that the importance to the United States government
of foreign central banks' confidence in the sanctity of their United
States-based deposits requires that special status be accorded to central
banks in the context of set-off as well as in that of prejudgment attach-
ment and other provisional remedies. 17 The argument may fail, how-
ever, given the express language of section 1607(c) and its legislative
history, which explicitly permit set-off. Moreover, the federal court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana, in De Sanchez v. Banco Central de
Nicaragua,'7 '2 held that the special treatment afforded to foreign cen-
tral banks under section 1611(b) did not immunize the Nicaraguan
central bank from suit under sections 1605(a)(3) and 1605(a)(5) of the
FSIA. 17  Courts would be likely to apply this principle by analogy and
find that, notwithstanding the importance to the United States govern-
ment of foreign central banks' confidence in the immunity of their
United States deposits, the special protection afforded by section
1611(b) against prejudgment attachment does not extend to set-off
under section 1607(c).
This conclusion also follows from the fact that set-off is a self-help
remedy that does not involve United States courts and, accordingly, is
less likely to provoke foreign relations problems than court-ordered
provisional remedies such as prejudgment attachment. In sum, there-
'e H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6622 (citations omitted).
10 National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 363-66 (1955).
171 As previously noted, the preservation of central banks' confidence in the invul-
nerability of their United States deposits was one of the principal reasons for shielding
them from prejudgment attachment in section 1611(b). See supra note 158 and accom-
panying text.
172 515 F. Supp. 900, 914 n.14 (E.D. La. 1981), affid, 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir.
1985).
178 Sections 1605(a)(3) and 1605(a)(5), respectively, are concerned with cases
claiming expropriation of property by a foreign state and with tort actions against a
foreign state in which the plaintiff seeks money damages. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(3),
1605(a)(5) (1988).
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fore, accounts of a central bank or other sovereign debtor may be sub-
ject to set-off exercised by its lender banks to the greater extent of ei-
ther (1) New York State common or statutory law, or (2) any
applicable set-off provisions in any agreements between the depositor
and any lender.
In the event, however, that a bank or other lender engaged in a
set-off which a court later found to be unjustified (for example, if the
bank wrongfully set off assets of one entity against obligations of an-
other obligor), the party against whom set-off was wrongfully exercised
would have a clear right to recover the sums improperly set off."74 In
addition, although there is no New York law directly on point, those
United States courts which have considered the issue have held or im-
plied that a bank which wrongfully sets off debts owed to the bank
against a depositor's deposits will be liable for all damages proximately
caused by such wrongful set-off.
For example, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held, in
Dockendorf v. Dakota County State Bank,1"5 that a jury was entitled to
award consequential damages to the owner of a cattle ranch whose bus-
iness and reputation were harmed as a result of the defendant's wrong-
ful set-off of certain local funds against the plaintiff's deposit account
with the bank. Similarly, a Massachusetts district court held, in Spen-
cer Cos. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.,' that the plaintiff would
be entitled to recover any damages it might be able to prove resulted
from an improper set-off against plaintiff's deposits by the defendant
bank.
17 7
3.5. Post-judgment Attachment or Execution
As noted above, commercial assets of the defendant, including a
central bank, would become susceptible to post-judgment attachment or
execution after the expiration of a "reasonable period of time" follow-
ing entry of any adverse judgment. For the period between the date of
judgment and the expiration of a "reasonable period of time," prejudg-
'" See, e.g., Appleton v. National Park Bank, 211 A.D. 708, 208 N.Y.S. 228, 231
(1925), affd, 241 N.Y. 561, 150 N.E. 555 (1925).
.1 673 F.2d 961, 967-68 (8th Cir. 1981).
27 81 Bankr. 194, 198-99 (D. Mass. 1987).
117 See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Curt Bullock Builders, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 159, 163
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (if the bank had no right of set-off, the resulting dishonor of plaintiff's
checks was wrongful and liability would be imposed for damages proximately caused
by the dishonor); HBL Indus. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 45 Bankr. 865, 868
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (wrongful set-off is a tort for wrongful conversion and damages will
be awarded if the plaintiff demonstrates a possessory interest in the converted
property).
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ment attachment would remain available to the extent previously dis-
cussed. All commercial assets of the defendant, including central bank
assets "held for its own account" which are situated in the State of
New York, would be attachable based on a judgment rendered in a
court sitting in New York. Moreover, assets located elsewhere in the
United States would become subject to attachment after the filing or
registration of the judgment in the state where the assets are located. In
addition, assets located outside the United States might well become
subject to attachment under the laws of that jurisdiction in a suit to
enforce the United States judgment. Conversely, in the event that an
action were commenced in a foreign (i.e., non-United States jurisdic-
tion) and a judgment obtained therein, assets located in New York
could become subject to attachment upon enforcement of the foreign
court's judgment if the terms of the Uniform Foreign Country Money
Judgments Recognition Act were met.
1 7 8
4. ATTACHMENT OF ASSETS OF OTHER PUBLIC SECTOR ENTITIES
FOR OBLIGATIONS OF A BORROWER
The foregoing discussion of immunity of a foreign state's assets
from attachment and the availability of alternative remedies assumes
that the creditor seeking relief has a valid claim against the entity
whose assets it is seeking to attach. However, state entities that are not
parties to loan agreements may have significant assets in the United
States to which a creditor may want to look to satisfy any judgment it is
awarded. Therefore, the question arises whether, in the absence of a
valid claim against a particular foreign public sector entity, a creditor
of a foreign sovereign debtor could look to the assets of the central bank
(assuming it is not a debtor) or to another public sector entity to satisfy
its claim. In the ordinary course, the answer is that it most likely can-
not look to these assets.
Courts in the United States will respect the independence of a sep-
arate legal entity, including a wholly-owned foreign state corporation,
absent extraordinary circumstances. 17 9 For example, in Letelier v. Re-
public of Chile8 ' and Hercaire International, Inc. v. Argentina,""'
the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Eleventh Cir-
cuits each held that the assets of a national airline company, wholly
171 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5301-5309 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1989).
179 First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S.
611, 626-27 (1983).
180 748 F.2d 790, 793 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985).
181 821 F.2d 559, 564-65 (11th Cir. 1987).
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owned by a government, could not be attached to satisfy a judgment
rendered against the government.
The limited circumstances under which United States courts will
not respect the separate juridical entity of foreign state corporations are
set forth in the leading case of First National City Bank v. Banco Para
el Comercio Exterior de Cuba ("Bancec").82 After stating that there is
a presumption in favor of honoring the separate legal status of foreign
state instrumentalities, the Supreme Court held that this presumption
can only be overcome where (1) the "corporate entity is so extensively
controlled by its [foreign sovereign] owner that a relationship of princi-
pal and agent is created," or (2) the separate corporate entity of a for-
eign instrumentality is abused to work fraud or injustice, or to defeat
some overriding public policy.""3 The Court emphasized that this stan-
dard was not a "mechanical formula for determining the circumstances
under which the normally separate juridical status of a government in-
strumentality is to be disregarded,"1 4 and, in effect, held that such a
decision can be made only by analyzing the peculiar facts of each case.
In the six years since Bancec, however, no court has upset the
presumption of corporate separateness in order to allow for the satisfac-
tion of claims against one debtor through the assets of another entity.
Although there may be reasons why a court could treat a central bank
differently from another public sector entity with respect to obligations
of the government (e.g., because it holds all of the government's liquid
assets), in only one case has a court even considered whether to disre-
gard the distinction between a government and its central bank. 8 5 In
that case, the court, without the benefit of any significant analysis or
any discussion of the differences between a central bank and other pub-
lic sector entities, respected the presumption of independence set forth
in Bancec.
Although the analysis will clearly turn on the particular facts in
question, a court applying United States law should generally uphold
the separate juridical status of a central bank under its local govern-
ment's law and not routinely permit a creditor of the government to
have recourse to a central bank's assets, including its reserves, to satisfy
its claims against the government."8 ' As to the first prong of the Bancec
182 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
183 Id. at 629-30.
1" Id. at 633.
185 Minpeco, S.A. v. Hunt, 686 F. Supp. 427, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1008 (1988).
186 Under New York law, any debt owed to a debtor, whether incurred within or
without the state, is subject to attachment. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 6202 (McKinney
1980); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5201(a) (McKinney 1978). On that basis, a lender
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test, despite the general supervisory control exercised by a government,
central banks are not "so extensively controlled by [the government]
that a relationship of principal and agent is created." 187 Although a
government exercises general supervision over its central bank and typi-
cally appoints its board of directors, on a day-to-day basis a central
bank operates independently of government control and respects the le-
gal formalities of its separate juridical status, such as debiting and cred-
iting the government's accounts for all transfers of funds.1 8 As to the
second prong of Bancec, it would not work a "fraud or injustice" to
recognize a central bank's separate juridical status, since the govern-
ment's creditors were aware of that status in negotiating any loan
agreement.
5. CONCLUSION
The reader of this Article may have been struck by the number of
legal issues raised and then given merely tentative and theoretical an-
swers. Litigation under sovereign debt agreements has been rare, and
therefore many of the issues that could arise in such actions do not have
definitive answers. Where firm authority is lacking, we have presented
our analysis of the resolution a New York state or federal court would
be most likely to reach if and when actually confronted with one of
these unanswered questions. But, until the courts face and resolve these
may argue that it is entitled to attach the assets of a central bank to satisfy the lender's
claim against a sovereign debtor because the central bank is presumably indebted to the
sovereign debtor by virtue of the government's deposits with the central bank. However,
this argument will most likely be rejected by New York courts. See, e.g., Smith v.
Amherst Acres, Inc., 43 A.D.2d 792, 350 N.Y.S.2d 236, 237 (1973) (attempted levy on
an asset owned by a third party owing a debt to debtor held to exceed creditor's power
to reach, property to satisfy judgment); Save Way Oil Co. v. 284 E. Parkway Corp.,
115 Misc. 2d 141, 453 N.Y.S.2d 554, 556 (Civ. Ct. 1982), appeal dismissed, 125 Misc.
26, 480 N.Y.S.2d 718 (App. Term. 1984) (creditor only entitled to restrain money
owed directly to debtor, and not entitled to restrain money owed to one who in turn is
allegedly indebted to debtor).
In addition, as a general rule, a creditor may attach a bank account only at the
particular branch at which the account is maintained or through the bank's main office.
Digitrex, Inc. v. Johnson, 491 F. Supp. 66, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Therm-X-Chemical
& Oil Corp. v. Extebank, 84 A.D.2d 787, 444 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (1981). Thus, under
New York law, a sovereign debtor's account at a central bank may only be attached to
the extent that a remedy is available under the law of the jurisdiction where the central
bank is located.
7 Bancec, 462 U.S. 611, 629 (1983).
188 See Hester Int'l Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 681 F. Supp. 371, 380-
81 (N.D. Miss. 1988), affd, 879 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1989) (wholly-owned Nigerian
corporation not an alter-ego or agent of Republic of Nigeria and therefore not liable for
the acts.of the Republic). See also Hercaire Int'l, Inc. v. Argentina, 821 F.2d 559, 564-
65 (11th Cir. 1987); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 793 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985).
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issues, our answers must remain merely speculative; and we conclude
this Article with the hope that there may continue to be no need for the
courts to prove us right or wrong.
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